Toward More Composable Software-Security Policies: Tools and Techniques by Lomsak, Daniel
University of South Florida
Scholar Commons
Graduate Theses and Dissertations Graduate School
January 2013
Toward More Composable Software-Security
Policies: Tools and Techniques
Daniel Lomsak
University of South Florida, dlomsak@mail.usf.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please contact
scholarcommons@usf.edu.
Scholar Commons Citation
Lomsak, Daniel, "Toward More Composable Software-Security Policies: Tools and Techniques" (2013). Graduate Theses and
Dissertations.
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/etd/4531
Toward More Composable Software-Security Policies: Tools and Techniques
by
Daniel Lomsak
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Computer Science and Engineering
College of Engineering
University of South Florida
Major Professor: Jay Ligatti, Ph.D.
Hao Zheng, Ph.D.
Yao Liu, Ph.D.
Natasˇa Jonoska, Ph.D.
Salvatore Morgera, Ph.D.
Date of Approval:
March 25, 2013
Keywords: Software Engineering, Visual Specification, Signed Regular Languages,
Policy-Specification Languages, Policy Composition
Copyright © 2013, Daniel Lomsak
DEDICATION
To my wife, who believed in me before I believed in myself, and endured alongside me.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES iii
LIST OF FIGURES iv
ABSTRACT vi
CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1
1.1 Related Work 2
1.2 Contributions 7
1.3 Summary of Relationships Between PoliSeer, PoCo, and Previous Work 9
1.4 Roadmap 9
CHAPTER 2 THE POLISEER INTERFACE 10
2.1 The Main Window 10
2.2 Creating Policies 12
2.3 Visualizing Policies 15
2.4 Modifying Policies 19
CHAPTER 3 IMPLEMENTATION OF POLISEER 21
3.1 Architectural Overview 21
3.2 Performance 22
3.3 Case Study: Policy Overview 24
3.4 PoliSeer Performance in Polymer 28
CHAPTER 4 POCO PRINCIPLES, GOALS, AND REQUIREMENTS 29
4.1 Execution Model and Terminology 29
4.2 Design Principles 32
4.3 Signed Regular Languages As Policy Outputs 34
4.4 Properties of Signed Regular Languages 39
4.5 The Functionally Complete Operations For Signed Regular Languages 58
CHAPTER 5 THE POCO LANGUAGE WITH EXAMPLES 65
5.1 Overview of PoCo 65
5.1.1 Example Base Policies 69
5.1.2 Example Combinators 74
5.2 Syntax Definition 78
5.3 Case Study: Polymer’s Email Policy 86
5.3.1 Base Policies 87
i
5.3.2 Super Policies 93
CHAPTER 6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 102
LIST OF REFERENCES 105
APPENDICES 109
Appendix A Omitted Auxiliary Methods From Section 5.3 110
ii
LIST OF TABLES
Table 4.1 Truth table for p = q expressed in terms of our original signed regular
operations. 61
Table 4.2 Truth table for p = q expressed in terms of ?. 63
Table 4.3 Truth table for p⊥q expressed in terms of ?. 63
Table 4.4 Truth table for p>q expressed in terms of ?. 64
iii
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1.1 Convoluted but composable Polymer policy requiring user confirmation
before making HTTP connections. 4
Figure 2.1 Main PoliSeer window divided into policy-selector and policy-tree pan-
els. 11
Figure 2.2 Policy-tree panel showing a root Audit policy parameterized by another
Policy and a String, though no children have yet been specified. 11
Figure 2.3 Policy-tree panel as the user enters a String argument for the Audit
policy. 12
Figure 2.4 Policy-tree panel showing an Audit policy with a subpolicy and string
argument. 13
Figure 2.5 The same policy-tree panel shown in Figure 2.4, except that the user
has now inserted a Conjunction policy between the DisSysCalls and
Audit policies. 14
Figure 2.6 Full tree for an example email policy. 16
Figure 2.7 The same policy tree shown in Figure 2.6 but simplified by hiding non-
policy nodes. 17
Figure 2.8 Warning displayed before deleting a node with multiple policy children. 18
Figure 3.1 Architectural overview of PoliSeer. 22
Figure 3.2 PoliSeer performance rendering policy trees during node insertion. 23
Figure 3.3 PoliSeer performance generating Polymer code. 24
Figure 3.4 Case-study policy, specified in PoliSeer, that constrains the PoliSeer
application itself. 25
Figure 4.1 Application execution with and without a security monitor. 30
Figure 4.2 Shaded diagrams of the signed regular operations. 36
Figure 4.3 Pentagon and diamond shapes, which are not sub-lattices of 〈R±,>,⊥〉. 57
iv
Figure 4.4 Lattice for 〈{a, b, c},>,⊥〉. 57
Figure 5.1 An illustration of the logic of the LimitFileReads policy. 71
Figure 5.2 Implementation of some simple Polymer base policies in PoCo. 87
Figure 5.3 PoCo version of Polymer’s AllowOnlyMIME policy. 88
Figure 5.4 PoCo version of Polymer’s Attachments policy. 90
Figure 5.5 PoCo version of Polymer’s ConfirmAndAllowOnlyHTTP policy. 91
Figure 5.6 PoCo version of Polymer’s ClassLoaders policy. 92
Figure 5.7 PoCo version of Polymer’s InterruptToCheckMem policy. 93
Figure 5.8 PoCo version of Polymer’s IncomingMail policy. 94
Figure 5.9 PoCo version of Polymer’s OutgoingMail policy. 95
Figure 5.10 PoCo version of Polymer’s IsClientSigned combinator. 96
Figure 5.11 PoCo version of Polymer’s Audit policy. 97
Figure 5.12 PoCo version of Polymer’s Conjunction policy. 99
Figure 5.13 PoCo version of Polymer’s Dominates policy. 100
Figure 5.14 PoCo version of Polymer’s TryWith policy. 100
Figure 5.15 PoCo version of Polymer’s Disjunction policy. 101
v
ABSTRACT
Complex software-security policies are difficult to specify, understand, and update. The
same is true for complex software in general, but while many tools and techniques exist
for decomposing complex general software into simpler reusable modules (packages, classes,
functions, aspects, etc.), few tools exist for decomposing complex security policies into sim-
pler reusable modules. The tools that do exist for modularizing policies either encapsulate
entire policies as atomic modules that cannot be decomposed or allow fine-grained policy
modularization but require expertise to use correctly.
This dissertation presents a policy-composition tool called PoliSeer [27, 26] and the
PoCo policy-composition software-security language. PoliSeer is a GUI-based tool designed
to enable users who are not expert policy engineers to flexibly specify, visualize, modify,
and enforce complex runtime policies on untrusted software. PoliSeer users rely on expert
policy engineers to specify universally composable policy modules; PoliSeer users then build
complex policies by composing those expert-written modules. This dissertation describes
the design and implementation of PoliSeer and a case study in which we have used PoliSeer
to specify and enforce a policy on PoliSeer itself.
PoCo is a language for specifying composable software-security policies. PoCo users
specify software-security policies in terms of abstract input-output event sequences. The
policy outputs are expressive, capable of describing all desired, irrelevant, and prohibited
events at once. These descriptive outputs compose well: operations for combining them
satisfy a large number of algebraic properties, which allows policy hierarchies to be designed
more simply and naturally. We demonstrate PoCo’s capability via a case study in which a
sophisticated policy is implemented in PoCo.
vi
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
General-purpose computers are only useful insofar as they execute software. Software
is only useful insofar as it serves the needs of its user. When users execute programs, they
do so with certain expectations of their behavior. For example, it is expected that an email
client only delivers a message to its addressees and not to unspecified parties. Failure to
meet the user’s requirements may be malicious attacks or unintentional bugs. In any case,
software better serves the user when s/he can explicitly codify his or her requirements and
force a program to obey them. This codification constitutes a software-security policy—a
restriction on program behavior. A runtime monitor is a mechanism that intercepts the
instructions that the untrusted application tries to execute, checking the policy each time to
determine the appropriate course of action. A monitor enforces a policy on an application
if it ensures that every instruction sequence the program could attempt is made to conform
to the policy.
Although complex software-security policies are difficult to specify, understand, and
update, they arise often in practice. For example, a system administrator or end user may
wish to enforce a complex collection of constraints (i.e., a policy) on an untrusted application
to limit that application’s access to resources such as files, memory, and peripheral devices,
and to obligate the untrusted application to audit security-relevant operations and employ
appropriate cryptographic protocols on network communications. In general, software-
security policies tend to become more and more complex over time, due to the emergence
of new attacks, users’ demands for relaxations to overly tight policy constraints, and the
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development of new application areas, like medical databases, which require domain-specific
security and privacy considerations [3].
1.1 Related Work
The trend of increasing complexity in software-security policies mirrors the trend of
increasing complexity in general software applications; however, many tools and techniques
exist to help software engineers specify, analyze, and modify complex software applications.
One of the most common techniques is modularization; engineers can modularize software
into independent, reusable components (e.g., packages, classes, functions, aspects, etc.)
that can be parameterized by, and can communicate with, other components through well-
defined interfaces. Decomposing complex software into simpler modules saves engineers from
having to manage software as a single, indecomposable code block. Integrated development
environments (IDEs) for software engineering typically provide good support for navigating
software modules [10, 34, 35, 38].
In contrast, recent efforts at creating tools for helping policy engineers specify arbitrary
runtime policies have only permitted the management of indecomposable policies [22, 20, 11,
9, 12, 13, 33, 21, 36, 17]. These tools enable engineers to specify an arbitrary runtime policy
as an isolated and centralized policy module; however, the tools do not enable engineers to
decompose that centralized policy into simpler subpolicy modules, which could be specified,
analyzed, reused, tested, and modified in isolation.
Other related efforts do allow users to specify, visualize, analyze, and/or compose poli-
cies, but only in particular domains. For example, the Policy Visualization Analysis tool
provides a GUI for managing existing SE Linux policies [41]; the Expandable Grid manages
access-control policies [31] (which are a proper subset of runtime-enforceable policies [24]);
the Policy Mapper manages location-based access-control policies [6]; front ends for SPAR-
CLE and PERMIS manage natural-language access-control and privacy policies [7, 18]; and
Fang and Firmato manage firewall policies [28, 1].
2
The Polymer project has attempted to address the lack of tools for managing compo-
sitions of arbitrary runtime policies [3, 4]. Polymer is a language and tool for specifying
and enforcing runtime policies on untrusted Java-bytecode applications. Polymer policies
exhibit universal composability (every policy can be composed with other policies). Polymer
achieves universal composability by (1) making all policies first-class objects (i.e., objects
that are treated like all other values, which can be passed as arguments to and returned
as results from methods) and (2) requiring all policy objects to implement a standard in-
terface. Hence, a Polymer policy P can be parameterized by another policy P ′; when P
has to decide whether and how to allow a security-relevant application event A to occur,
P may query P ′ for a response to A and use that response to generate its own response.
For example, a Conjunction policy might take two policy arguments P1 and P2 in its con-
structor; the overall policy can enforce the conjunction of P1 and P2 by always responding
to security-relevant events with the most restrictive of the responses of P1 and P2. In this
case we call Conjunction a superpolicy and P1 and P2 its subpolicies. As another example,
an Audit superpolicy may be parameterized by a policy P and a string S; then Audit
can blindly enforce P while logging all of P ’s responses to security-relevant events in a file
named S. Using such techniques of parameterizing policies with other policies, engineers
can use Polymer to build complex runtime policies as compositions of simpler subpolicy
modules (Figure 2.6 provides a high-level view of a complex Polymer policy that specifies
runtime constraints on email clients and is built by composing simple subpolicy modules).
Although Polymer enables arbitrarily complex runtime policies to be specified more
conveniently as compositions of subpolicies, Polymer achieves this convenience by requiring
each individual policy module to be specified surprisingly inconveniently. The inconvenience
stems from Polymer’s requiring users to adhere to a complex programming discipline de-
signed to partition policy code into effectless (i.e., free of state updates and I/O operations)
and effectful methods. Figure 1.1 (which is based on a policy downloaded from the Polymer
project’s website [5]) shows the convoluted way policy logic must be specified in Polymer
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public class ConfirmAllHTTP extends Policy {
private boolean userCancel = false, noAsk = false;
public Response query(Action a) {
aswitch(a) {
case 〈abs void NetworkOpen(String addr, int port)〉:
if (port==80 || port==443) {
if (noAsk) return new OK(this);
if (userCancel) return new ExceptionResponse(this);
return new InsertResponse(this,new Action(null,
“JOptionPane.showConfirmDialog(Component, Object,
String, int)”,
new Object[ ]{null, “Allow HTTP to ”+addr+“?”,
“Warning”,
new Integer(JOptionPane.YES NO OPTION)}));
}
}
return new IrrelevantResponse(this);
}
public void accept(Response r) {
if (r.isExn()) userCancel = false;
if (r.isOK()) noAsk = false;
}
public void result(Response r, Object rslt) {
if (r.isIns() && ((Integer)rslt).intValue()==JOptionPane.NO OPTION)
userCancel = true;
else if (r.isIns() && ((Integer)rslt).intValue()==JOptionPane.YES OPTION)
noAsk = true;
}
}
Figure 1.1. Convoluted but composable Polymer policy requiring user confirmation before
making HTTP connections (taken from [5]).
in order to make policies safely composable. As this example illustrates, specifying policies
in Polymer requires care and expertise.
In Polymer, policies respond to input actions (method invocations), which produce
results (return values), by outputting suggestions, which represent the policy’s willingness to
proceed with the input action. Some suggestions are IrrSug (the policy considers the action
irrelevant), OKSug (the action is relevant, but permitted), and InsSug (some other action
should be executed first before reconsidering the input action). Suggestions are so-called
because only one will be followed per input action; the other policies are effectively ignored.
When a suggestion is followed, the monitor notifies its suggester(s) beforehand providing an
opportunity to update policy state. When following a suggestion entails executing an action,
the action’s result is relayed to the suggester(s) for further bookkeeping. This convoluted
control-flow model makes policies harder to reason about, particularly when InsSugs are
involved. Polymer policies are only able to emit suggestions for actions, so they cannot
enforce the same properties on results as they can on actions.
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Polymer policies being limited to emitting a single suggestion for each input has some
significant consequences:
1. Policies cannot express more complex intentions such as a preference for some events
combined with explicit opposition to some others without being explicitly asked
about each.
2. Combinators are generally incapable of combining the intent of their subpolicies
because some suggestions are parameterized over actions, results, or exceptions and
there is no given way to combine these parameters.
3. Combinators typically output one of their subpolicies’ suggestions and discard all
others, sometimes at the expense of commutativity (e.g., Conjunction on two In-
sSugs [4]). Therefore, combinator-policy organizations are often more sensitive to
ordering than the policy author would like, and distinguishing such subtleties is an
additional burden.
Policy-specification languages exist in which policy intent is more readily combined, but
the policies are limited to access-control. PBel policies, for example, employ Belnap logic in
which opposing Boolean values can be combined into either > (“conflict”) or ⊥ (“bottom”),
representing the disjunction or conjunction of true and false, respectively [8]. Ismene policies
allow entities to specify requirements and restrictions on their interactions with others over
a network (e.g., requiring the use of a certain cryptographic algorithm or preventing those
without sufficient authority) [29]. These requirements and restrictions of each entity are
combined to produce a global policy for governing the overall session in a manner that
respects them via a “reconciliation” process. Tempura is a simulation tool for examining
policies written as Interval Temporal Logic formulae which can express safety properties
whose permission decisions can depend on a discrete clock time [39]. ITL expresses grants
and denials as signed “authorizations” which can be combined giving preference to one or
the other or by reporting an error.
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The problem of formal verification is closely related to policy enforcement in that both
aim to ensure the conformity of a system to a specification. Formal verification approaches
often employ some form of temporal logic to express restrictions on how a system may
evolve from state to state [30]. Linear Temporal Logic (LTL), for instance, is a system for
expressing formulae over propositions (Boolean variables) whose values may change on each
discrete “step” of time. A state is a snapshot of the proposition values. An LTL formula
is either satisfied or not by a given sequence of states, but has no power to modify that
sequence.
Aspect-oriented languages, such as AspectJ, allow program code to be modularized ac-
cording to logical categories (typically called “concerns” of the program) of which a security
policy is one. Although most programming languages have some means of grouping logi-
cally related code (e.g., packages, classes, and methods), cross-cutting concerns are facets
of program behavior that span across several such boundaries by nature. For example, the
task of updating a log when certain behaviors occur is a famous cross-cutting concern. Sup-
pose that we want to log every file access, we would normally have to insert and maintain
logging code everywhere that a file access occurs, which is inconvenient. In AspectJ, an
aspect implements a concern by defining a pointcut (pattern that matches relevant code)
and advice (code specific to the concern) to be executed at join points (parts of the program
matching the pointcut). However, AspectJ aspects are incomposable in that when multiple
aspects offer advice at the same join point, execution of all advice proceeds according to
universal precedence rules rather than by the programmer’s discretion.
Mandatory Results Automata (MRAs) are expressive security mechanisms that monitor
both the application’s actions and the results of those actions [25]. MRAs are a more real-
istic model for runtime monitors than earlier security automata, e.g., Edit Automata [23],
because they respect that programs generally receive a return value for each computation
before moving on to the next one. The result-modifying capacity of MRAs further widens
the gap between transformative monitors and those suitable only for access control. How-
ever, MRAs exist solely as a formal model.
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1.2 Contributions
Policy specification, being a special problem domain, is well served by custom-tailored
tools that address its concerns conveniently. This dissertation presents two such tools:
1. PoliSeer, a GUI-based utility designed to make it simpler and more convenient for
non-experts to specify, visualize, modify, and enforce complex policies.
2. PoCo (Policy Composition), a language for specifying expressive runtime software-
security policies in a modular fashion where individual policies compose well, com-
bining their intentions comprehensively to avoid arbitrary choices and subtle policy-
organization concerns.
As far as we are aware, PoliSeer provides the first GUI for composing arbitrary runtime se-
curity policies. PoCo constitutes a significant improvement in policy specification, building
on lessons learned through experience with existing solutions.
PoliSeer users import universally composable policies from a policy library, compose
them in meaningful ways by declaring arguments for all policy parameters, and gener-
ate code for the composed policy. We believe this process is straightforward enough that
system administrators and even advanced end users can use PoliSeer to specify and en-
force application-level policies; users simply customize (i.e., specify arguments for) expert-
authored policies. Hence, the primary requirement for using PoliSeer is an ability to read
and understand documentation for expert-authored policies.
Beyond specifying complex policies as compositions of simpler subpolicy modules, policy
engineers can use PoliSeer to visualize complex policies holistically (as shown in Figure 2.6).
Such high-level policy visualizations may improve the engineers’ understanding of large and
complex policies and help engineers locate and isolate problematic policy modules.
Our implementation of PoliSeer uses Polymer as the underlying language of universally
composable policies; in other words, Polymer is the language in which our PoliSeer imple-
mentation imports and exports policies. However, we have partitioned the implementation
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into Polymer-specific and non-Polymer-specific modules to make PoliSeer readily portable
to other policy-specification languages with first-class and parameterized policies.
PoliSeer is a graphical, Turing-incomplete policy-specification tool, so it lacks the expres-
siveness of Turing-complete policy-specification languages like Polymer [3, 4], Naccio [13],
and PSLang [12]. Instead, PoliSeer users must rely on expert policy engineers to make use-
ful universally composable policies available. This sort of trade-off between expressiveness
and usability is common with security-management tools. We believe that PoliSeer strikes
a good balance between expressiveness and usability because, like standard IDEs, engineers
may make use of PoliSeer’s convenience when it does not impede expressiveness, but when
greater expressiveness is required, PoliSeer users can always specify Polymer policies on
their own and then import them directly into PoliSeer.
PoCo users specify software-security policies by declaring the sequential patterns of
monitor inputs and outputs that are matched by all satisfactory program executions. These
sequences support repetition and switching operations to incorporate loops and branches in
the policy logic. Policies are free of externally observable effects by design, so policy authors
don’t need to rely on discipline to properly manage effectful computations (in contrast with
Polymer’s reliance on programmer discipline to manage effects).
PoCo policies specify input patterns as regular expressions that are matched against
string representations of events input into the monitor. The output patterns are positively
or negatively signed regular expressions (or combinations thereof) that describe the desirable
and unacceptable output events, respectively, at that stage of the execution. Signed regular
expressions allow policies to describe the whole set of favorable and unfavorable outputs
at once as well as those they are indifferent toward (the strings in neither category). This
feature is particularly useful in that negatively-signed expressions with infinite languages
can be used to object to broad categories of events all at once. Signed regular expressions
can be operated on similarly to their unsigned counterparts.
Regular languages are appreciated for satisfying a number of closure properties, which
are useful for principled policy combination. For example, conjunction, disjunction, and in-
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version are common policy-combination strategies, and regular languages are closed under
intersection, union, and complementation. Properties like the commutativity and associa-
tivity of intersection and union operations free policy authors from considerations about
which policy is on which side of a conjunction, for example. Removing opportunities for
subtle corner-case behaviors improves policy correctness and reduces specification effort.
1.3 Summary of Relationships Between PoliSeer, PoCo, and Previous Work
Whereas existing tools for policy specification, visualization, analysis, and/or composi-
tion such as Firmato and Expandable Grids are for particular domains such as firewall and
access-control policies, PoliSeer is for arbitrary runtime software-security policies. PoCo
policies have a more straightforward control flow than those in Polymer because PoCo poli-
cies are aware of all monitor inputs and respond to both actions and results in the same
manner. PoCo policies are also able to express their intent completely in a way that can be
directly combined with others’, unlike Polymer’s suggestions and AspectJ’s advice.
Although PBel policies, Ismene policies, and Interval Temporal Logic formulae compose
well, they are limited to specifying access-control policies, whereas PoCo policies compose
well and are more expressive. PoCo is influenced by the LTL’s sense of sequentially ordered
requirements and declarative nature, but its policies go beyond expressing what must hold to
include how to affect the relationship between input and output events to make it so. PoCo
is designed such that specifiable polices describe MRA executions and are MRA-enforceable.
1.4 Roadmap
We proceed as follows. Chapter 2 describes the design of the PoliSeer GUI. Chapter
3 explains and evaluates our implementation of PoliSeer as a Java application that in-
puts and outputs Polymer policies and reports our experiences implementing a case-study
policy in PoliSeer. Chapter 4 details the principles, goals, and requirements of the PoCo
policy-specification language. Chapter 5 introduces PoCo’s linguistic constructs along with
illustrative examples. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes.
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CHAPTER 2
THE POLISEER INTERFACE
PoliSeer aims to provide a straightforward graphical interface for conveniently and flex-
ibly managing complex policies.
2.1 The Main Window
The main PoliSeer window consists of two panels, as shown in Figure 2.1. The left panel
is the policy-selector panel; the right panel is the policy-tree panel.
1. The policy-selector panel allows the user to navigate the machine’s file system to find
existing composable policies. Our implementation begins by populating the policy-
selector panel with all subdirectories and .poly files (i.e., Polymer policy files) in the
user’s home directory. The policy-selector panel makes use of a standard interface
for navigating the file system: clickable areas expand and contract subdirectories.
When a user expands a subdirectory, PoliSeer searches for, parses, and displays all
policy files in the newly visible directory. PoliSeer parses the policy files so that it
can display the types of parameters each policy expects (in its constructor) next to
that policy’s name in the policy-selector panel, as shown in Figure 2.1 (when multiple
constructors exist for the same policy, users select the desired constructor from a
drop-down list before inserting the policy into a policy tree). Because computer users
are accustomed to this sort of expand-and-contract navigation interface (e.g., the
Windows file explorer and many application programs employ the same interface),
navigating policy libraries is straightforward.
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Figure 2.1. Main PoliSeer window divided into policy-selector and policy-tree panels. The
policy-tree panel is displaying the default, empty policy.
2. The policy-tree panel contains a graphical representation of the policy currently be-
ing created, visualized, or modified. When PoliSeer begins executing, it displays the
empty policy as shown in Figure 2.1. The empty policy consists of a single grayed-
out node containing the text <Policy>, which indicates that PoliSeer expects that
node to be filled in with a policy. In general, grayed-out nodes in a PoliSeer policy
indicate incompletions in the policy; the text in a grayed-out node indicates the type
of data that must be inserted into that node. In this way, PoliSeer communicates to
the user whether, and in what ways, policies are incomplete. For example, Figure 2.2
shows a policy-tree panel for an incomplete, one-node Audit policy parameterized
Figure 2.2. Policy-tree panel showing a root Audit policy parameterized by another Policy
and a String, though no children have yet been specified.
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Figure 2.3. Policy-tree panel as the user enters a String argument for the Audit policy.
by another Policy and a String; the policy is incomplete until the user specifies
one Policy and one String argument for Audit.
The only windows incorporated into PoliSeer besides the split main window are modal
popup windows (for routine operations like selecting a location to load a policy from or save
a policy to) and a window for viewing policy source code (described in Section 2.3).
2.2 Creating Policies
PoliSeer’s basic interface for creating policies is simple. Users may select a policy in the
policy-selector panel by left-clicking on the policy name. Having clicked on a policy P in the
policy-selector panel, the user may left-click on any landing area L in the policy-tree panel
to insert P into L. Valid landing areas are grayed-out <Policy> nodes and branch-insertion
points (BIPs) in the policy-tree panel. PoliSeer automatically displays BIPs as small black
squares in the policy-tree panel on every branch into which a user could possibly insert a
policy.
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Figure 2.4. Policy-tree panel showing an Audit policy with a subpolicy and string argument.
This complete policy disallows system calls (i.e., java.lang.Runtime.exec methods) at
runtime while logging all policy decisions to a file named email.log.
For example, Figure 2.1 shows PoliSeer as it begins, with an empty policy-tree panel. A
user may add the Audit policy as the root of the policy tree by clicking on the Audit policy
in the policy-selector panel and then clicking on the grayed-out Policy node in the policy-
tree panel. The policy tree in Figure 2.2 results from this addition; Audit has been added as
the root node of the policy, but two new grayed-out nodes have appeared because PoliSeer
has parsed the Audit policy and determined that it is parameterized by another Policy
and a String. The user may then insert a String as the right child of the Audit policy
by clicking on the grayed-out String node and entering the string in a pop-up window, as
shown in Figure 2.3. Users may enter other types of arguments to policies, such as ints,
floats, booleans, and chars, similarly to Strings, but PoliSeer will first confirm that the
user’s entry can be parsed as a value of the correct type. Currently, PoliSeer can only
import and manipulate policies with a primitive-type String and Policy parameter, but
all the policies provided in the standard Polymer distribution [5] satisfy this constraint.
Continuing with this example, Figure 2.4 shows a complete policy tree that results from
inserting a (childless) policy and a string into the grayed-out nodes of Figure 2.2. Two
BIPs exist in Figure 2.4; a user may insert a policy node into this policy above the Audit
root or above the DisSysCalls child of Audit. To insert a Conjunction policy between
the Audit and DisSysCalls nodes, the user simply clicks on the Conjunction policy in
the policy-selector panel and then clicks on the BIP between the Audit and DisSysCalls
policies in Figure 2.4; the result is shown in Figure 2.5.
13
Figure 2.5. The same policy-tree panel shown in Figure 2.4, except that the user has now
inserted a Conjunction policy between the DisSysCalls and Audit policies.
By building policy trees, PoliSeer users may specify complex policies. All the super-
policies in policy trees can be thought of as metapolicies; superpolicies like Conjunction
specify how to combine any possible combination of constraints imposed by subpolicies,
even when those constraints conflict. For example, a PoliSeer user may specify a policy as
being the conjunction of two subpolicies P1 and P2, where P2 is defined to always respond
to security-relevant actions in the opposite way as P1 (e.g., when P1 OKs an action, P2
halts the target, and when P1 does anything besides OK an action, P2 OKs the action;
this is the Not superpolicy described in Section 4.1). Such a composition of conflicting
policies is perfectly legal, and it is up to the semantics of the superpolicies to determine
what happens when policies specify conflicting constraints. In this case, the Conjunction
superpolicy obeys the strictest of its subpolicy constraints on each security- relevant action,
so the overall (Conjunction) policy will always obey P1’s constraints as long as P1 does
not OK an action, but when P1 OKs an action, the overall Conjunction will have to obey
P2 and halt the application. The ability to use metapolicies (i.e., superpolicies) to resolve
conflicts between composed subpolicies is one of the key benefits of universally composable
policies in systems like Polymer.
Having created a (complete or incomplete) PoliSeer policy, a user may save it to a .psr
file (which is simply a serialization of the policy tree) with the File -> Save Tree menu
option and may generate ready-to-enforce Polymer code for the policy in a .poly file with
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the File -> Generate Policy Code option. Conversely, users may resume creating, vi-
sualizing, or modifying a saved .psr policy with the File -> Load Tree option. When
exporting an incomplete PoliSeer policy to a .poly file, PoliSeer automatically parameter-
izes the exported policy by all missing policy components (e.g., if the policy is missing one
child of a Conjunction superpolicy, then the exported policy’s constructor will accept a
Policy argument to fill in for that missing child).
2.3 Visualizing Policies
As Figures 2.6–2.8 demonstrate, PoliSeer’s policy-tree panel can provide a useful high-
level visualization of complex security policies as compositions of simpler subpolicy modules.
If PoliSeer’s visualization of a policy is too high level, users can always choose the View
-> Policy Source menu option to obtain the source-code-level details of the most recently
selected policy. Examining a policy’s source-code documentation can be helpful for PoliSeer
users when figuring out which arguments to specify for that policy. For example, a PoliSeer
user may see and be intrigued by the Audit policy, view the documentation in the Audit
source code, understand what the policy does and which arguments it expects, include Audit
in the policy tree, and supply appropriate child-node arguments based on an understanding
of Audit’s semantics.
As another aid for visualizing policy compositions, PoliSeer provides a toggleable menu
option View -> Show Non-Policy Nodes. This option removes (or restores) non-policy
nodes in the policy-tree panel. Removing non-policy nodes from a policy tree may simplify
the user’s view of a policy, as Figures 2.6 and 2.7 demonstrate. Non-policy nodes often
clutter a policy tree without providing much insight into the policy’s organization. For
example, non-policy nodes may specify port-number, IP-address, or filename arguments to
policies, which may be irrelevant for understanding the overall policy structure.
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Figure 2.6. Full tree for an example email policy (taken from [3, 4]).
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Figure 2.7. The same policy tree shown in Figure 2.6 but simplified by hiding non-policy nodes.
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Figure 2.8. Warning displayed before deleting a node with multiple policy children. PoliSeer has highlighted the descendants that
will be discarded along with the node being deleted.
2.4 Modifying Policies
Although we have found PoliSeer’s interface for creating and visualizing policies conve-
nient and straightforward, we have found policy-modification operations more nuanced and
challenging to enable and implement.
PoliSeer users may modify policy trees in three ways:
1. Users may swap two existing sibling nodes (and their subtrees) by dragging and
dropping one sibling node on another. Swapping subpolicies can be useful when
dealing with superpolicies that make semantic distinctions between the order of their
children (e.g., Polymer’s Dominates superpolicy gives priority to its left child [3, 4]).
Nodes must have the same type to be swapped (e.g., a String cannot be swapped
with a Policy), and PoliSeer currently does not support non-sibling node swapping
due to policy-tree circularities that arise when swapping a node with one of its
ancestors.
2. Users may replace a policy node P in the policy tree with a policy P ′ selected from
the policy-selector panel by left-clicking P ′ in the policy-selector panel and then
left-clicking on P in the policy tree. PoliSeer only allows P ′ to replace P when the
parameter types of P and P ′ are well aligned. Technically, this means that PoliSeer
must be able to assign each of P ’s nonempty children to be children of P ′ without
introducing any type conflicts. If P and P ′ are well aligned, PoliSeer performs the
replacement by making the P node be a P ′ node and then traversing P ’s children
from left to right and reassigning each nonempty child of P to the leftmost child of
P ′ with the same type. In this way, PoliSeer attempts to allow policy replacement
in all cases in which it could possibly make sense.
3. Users may delete a policy-tree node by right-clicking on it. Before deleting any
nonempty policy-tree node, PoliSeer confirms the deletion with a popup dialog box.
When deleting a policy node N , the leftmost policy-child of N takes the place of N
in the policy tree, and PoliSeer discards all other children of N . Because users may
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not expect this deletion semantics, PoliSeer highlights all the about-to-be-discarded
nodes and displays a confirmation window before actually discarding the highlighted
nodes. Figure 2.8 illustrates this interface.
When combined with the ability to insert policy nodes into any landing area in a policy
tree, these three operations provide users a complete palette of basic policy-specification,
-visualization, and -modification tools.
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CHAPTER 3
IMPLEMENTATION OF POLISEER
We have implemented PoliSeer as an open-source Java application, available online at
http://www.cse.usf.edu/~ligatti/projects/poliseer/. The implementation is 3351
lines of code in 12 source-code files.
3.1 Architectural Overview
Our PoliSeer implementation consists of three high-level modules:
1. The front end (1828 lines of code). This module reads and parses Polymer files for
input into PoliSeer. When a user opens a directory in the policy-selector panel,
PoliSeer parses the Polymer files in that directory to determine how they are pa-
rameterized, that is, which types of arguments the policies’ constructors expect to
receive. PoliSeer uses this type information to ensure that all policies receive argu-
ments of the proper types and to prepare grayed-out children in the policy tree, as
discussed in Section 2.2. Our front end parses Polymer files with a parser generated
by JavaCC, a top-down parser generator [19].
2. The PoliSeer GUI (1451 lines of code). This module contains all the code to imple-
ment PoliSeer’s graphical user interface, as described in Chapter 2.
3. The back end (72 lines of code). This module generates Polymer code for the policy
tree being visualized. Users can input the code that this module generates directly
into the Polymer system, which will then enforce the specified policy on untrusted
Java-bytecode applications.
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Figure 3.1. Architectural overview of PoliSeer.
Figure 3.1 summarizes PoliSeer’s implementation architecture. The Polymer-dependent
front and back ends are distinctly separated from the Polymer-independent GUI, so de-
velopers can change PoliSeer’s underlying policy-specification language from Polymer to a
language L by writing and plugging in new front and back ends for L.
3.2 Performance
We have tested our implementation’s performance during basic operations such as pars-
ing Polymer files and inserting nodes into policy trees. The tests were performed on a Sony
Vaio laptop with Intel Core2 Duo 1.73GHz CPUs and 1GB of RAM, running Kubuntu 8.10.
For all tests, we report running times obtained by averaging real execution times over ten
executions.
Our first test measured the time taken for PoliSeer to start up, build the GUI, and exit
at the end of PoliSeer’s main method. This time included the virtual-machine start-up time
and was just 830ms on average.
Next, we measured the time taken for PoliSeer to parse the Polymer files in the policy
library to determine the types of parameters in the policies’ constructors. With an average
Polymer-policy-file size of 84.5 lines of code, PoliSeer parsed the Polymer files in only 3.1ms
on average.
Our third test measured the amount of time PoliSeer took to render a policy tree during
insertion of nodes into the tree. This rendering time dominates the amount of time it takes
for PoliSeer to insert new nodes into policy trees; node-insertion time is O(lg n) for finding
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Figure 3.2. PoliSeer performance rendering policy trees during node insertion.
where to modify the tree data structure, O(1) for modifying the tree at that point, and
O(n) for rendering the new tree with the inserted node (where n is the number of nodes
in the policy tree). Figure 3.2 confirms the linear growth of policy-tree rendering. All
tree-rendering-intensive operations in PoliSeer (i.e., node insertion, swapping, replacement,
and deletion) exhibit a performance similar to that shown in Figure 3.2. Although tree-
rendering times never exceeded one second, even for trees with hundreds of nodes, a good
optimization to consider in the future would be to only re-render the modified portions of
trees during policy-tree manipulations.
Finally, we measured the time taken for PoliSeer to generate Polymer code files from
policy trees. We implement code generation by (recursively) preorder-traversing the policy
tree, while concatenating strings to construct every policy-tree node. As Figure 3.3 illus-
trates, PoliSeer’s code-generation time remains low (less than a second) even for policies
with many hundred nodes.
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Figure 3.3. PoliSeer performance generating Polymer code.
In summary, all the basic PoliSeer operations have tolerable performance, and per-
formance delays do not even become noticeable until the user manipulates policy trees
containing several hundred nodes.
3.3 Case Study: Policy Overview
We have designed a complex case-study PoliSeer policy that restricts the runtime be-
havior of PoliSeer itself; that is, we have created a PoliSeer-controlling policy in PoliSeer.
Moreover, we have successfully executed PoliSeer in the Polymer system while enforcing
this PoliSeer-created policy.
Figure 3.4 displays the policy tree for our case-study policy. This policy has a Con-
junction as its root, so it constrains the untrusted application (PoliSeer in this case) by
always responding to a security-relevant action with the most restrictive of its subpolicies’
responses to the same action. In other words, the case-study policy always attempts to
respect the restrictions of two high-level subpolicies.
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Figure 3.4. Case-study policy, specified in PoliSeer, that constrains the PoliSeer application itself.
We based the first of these two high-level subpolicies on policies described in earlier
work [3, 4, 5]. This branch of the case-study policy enforces constraints that should be
included in all Polymer policies to prevent the untrusted application program from using
reflection, constructing class loaders, writing .class files, or invoking system-level func-
tions (with java.lang.Runtime.exec methods). This branch also includes the Interrupt-
ToCheckMem policy, which notifies the user if the virtual machine’s memory consumption
exceeds a specified threshold. All of these subpolicies are conjoined by Dominates super-
policies, which act as short-circuit Conjunction policies in our case study (though their
precise semantics is more subtle [3, 4]).
The second of the two high-level subpolicies in our case-study policy specifies constraints
that we particularly wanted to enforce on PoliSeer; something would be wrong if PoliSeer
violated any of these constraints. We call this branch of policies the PoliSeer-specific policy.
Like the entire case-study policy, the PoliSeer-specific policy decomposes into two branches,
joined with a Dominates superpolicy (which again acts as a short-circuit Conjunction here).
The first branch of the PoliSeer-specific policy is the NoNetworkOpens policy, which
disallows the untrusted application from opening any network sockets.
The second branch of the PoliSeer-specific policy restricts the PoliSeer application (i.e.,
code in the poliseer package)—but not the case-study policy we are enforcing on PoliSeer
(i.e., code in the poliseer.policy package)—from opening files with extensions other than
.psr, .poly, or .class. Intuitively, although the case-study policy may open other types
of files (perhaps because, e.g., we later extend the policy with auditing capabilities that
necessitate opening log files), the PoliSeer application itself should have no effect on the
file system except for reading and writing PoliSeer (.psr), Polymer (.poly), and Java-
bytecode (.class) files. The application will actually not be able to write .class files
(because the NoWriteWithExt policy already disallows it), but the case-study policy does
allow the application to read .class files (because Java compilers often optimize benign
operations like initializing nested classes by having the outer class’s initializer read the
bytecode of the inner class).
26
This second branch of the PoliSeer-specific policy contains four subpolicies:
1. TryWith combines two subpolicies by first obtaining its left child’s response to the
security-relevant action A that the untrusted application is attempting to execute.
If the left child allows A to execute unconditionally then so does the TryWith su-
perpolicy; otherwise, TryWith responds to A with whatever response its right child
returns for A.
2. InspectStackFor takes a String argument S and inspects the runtime call stack
for a method called from package S. More specifically, the policy traverses the
call stack from the most recent to the oldest method invocation and disallows the
security-relevant action the untrusted application is about to execute if and only if
the traversal reaches a call from S before reaching a doPrivileged call.
3. Not inverts the response of its subpolicy. For example, if the subpolicy responds to
a security-relevant action by halting, the Not superpolicy will respond by allowing
the action.
4. OpenWithExt takes a String argument S and allows file-open actions to execute if
and only if they access files with names that end with file-extension S.
The case-study policy enforces the desired file-open subpolicy by chaining together Try-
With combinators. Every child of the TryWith policies allows one type of file-open action
to execute; a file open is only disallowed when none of those children allow it. In turn, the
TryWith children allow actions from outside the poliseer package, actions from within the
poliseer.policy package (technically, from Not outside the poliseer.policy package),
actions that open .class files, actions that open .poly files, and actions that open .psr
files.
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3.4 PoliSeer Performance in Polymer
We measured the performance of PoliSeer executing in the Polymer system while en-
forcing the case-study policy. The measurements provide some insight into the runtime
overhead induced by enforcing Polymer policies.
In general, runtime-policy-enforcement overheads depend on the complexity of the policy
being enforced and the number of times that policy must respond to security-relevant ac-
tions. One important consideration in this regard is that our case-study policy only reasons
about (i.e., considers security relevant) application methods that open files, open network
sockets, make system-level calls, implement reflection, or construct class loaders. Enforc-
ing the case-study policy induces runtime overhead only when the untrusted application
(PoliSeer) invokes one of these security-relevant methods. Therefore, operations like insert-
ing nodes into policy trees, which do not execute security-relevant methods, run equally
quickly regardless of whether the case-study policy is being enforced. On the other hand,
application-level operations that do execute security-relevant methods experience overhead
when the case-study policy is being enforced, and that overhead is proportional to the
number of security-relevant methods executed.
The average time for PoliSeer to start up in the Polymer system was 3.7s, much higher
than the 0.83s start-up time we measured when the case-study policy was not being enforced.
This significant start-up overhead is common in Polymer due to the large number of files
that get opened as the virtual machine loads classes during application startup (recall that
our policy considers file openings security relevant).
Besides the start-up overhead, none of the overheads induced by enforcing the case-study
policy on PoliSeer were noticeable. The average time to parse Polymer files increased by
0.8ms, and the average time to generate Polymer code increased by 1.3ms (regardless of the
policy size), when enforcing the case-study policy. The case-study policy has to respond
once to each Polymer-file parsing and code-generation operation because these operations
each entail one security-relevant file-open action. Hance, enforcing the case-study policy
added about 1ms to the execution time of every security-relevant action.
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CHAPTER 4
POCO PRINCIPLES, GOALS, AND REQUIREMENTS
This chapter presents the philosophical and technical materials that form the foundation
of the PoCo (Policy Composition) language. The language’s design is guided by a num-
ber of precepts born out of experience with existing policy-specification languages—mainly
Polymer [5, 3, 4, 2]. The ultimate goal is to ease the overall burden of specifying complex,
general-purpose policies by simplifying how policies are combined and individually specified
without sacrificing expressiveness.
4.1 Execution Model and Terminology
First, we model the execution of a potentially dangerous program and introduce the
relevant vocabulary. The model and terminology presented here is not original, but is
necessary background for understanding the remainder of this dissertation. The form of
PoCo policies is largely shaped by how the monitored execution of software is modeled.
PoCo is designed to express policies that are enforceable by Mandatory Results Automata
(MRAs) [25].
The MRA model, depicted in Figure 4.1, involves the following components:
1. Actions—objects that represent computations (e.g., function calls).
2. Results—objects that represent the return values of actions (e.g., primitive values
or data structures).
3. Events—a generic term pertaining to both actions and results.
4. The executing system—an evaluator that outputs results for input actions.
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Figure 4.1. Application execution with and without a security monitor. An application
executes normally (a) by sending actions to the executing system and receiving results from
it directly. A security monitor regulates the actions sent to the executing system and results
sent to the application (b) such that only valid executions occur. This is an interpretation
of Fig. 1 from [25].
5. The untrusted application—a potentially dangerous program that executes by emit-
ting actions and receiving their results.
6. The security monitor—a (potential) manipulator of the events transmitted between
the application and executing system.
In the MRA model, the application sends actions to the executing system to evaluate,
and the system replies to each action with a result. The monitor manages the exchange
between the two, behaving as the system from the application’s perspective and as the
application from the system’s perspective. When the monitor receives an action a from
the application (the only possibility when execution begins), it can either output a to the
system, output an alternative action a′ 6= a to the system, or output some result to the
application. When the monitor receives a result r from the system, it can either output r
to the application, output an alternative result r′ 6= r to the application, or output some
action to the system. Results are called “mandatory” because the application and monitor
can’t output a new action until receiving a result for the last action it output.
30
The following notation and definitions, many of which are are introduced in [25] and are
re-stated here, are used throughout the remainder of this dissertation:
1. Σ is the alphabet—a finite set of symbols.
2. s1s2 · · · sn, where si ∈ Σ, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is called a string over Σ.
3.  is the zero-length empty string.
4. Σ∗ denotes the set of all strings over Σ; Σ+ is the same but omits .
5. Metavariable σ ranges over Σ∗.
6. A ⊂ Σ+ is the nonempty, computable set of all actions.
7. Metavariable a ranges over A.
8. R ⊆ (Σ+ rA) is the nonempty, computable set of all results of actions.
9. Metavariable r ranges over R.
10. E = A ∪R is the set of all events.
11. Metavariable e ranges over E.
12. 〈e, e′〉 is an event pair called an exchange, where e is called the input event (i.e., an
event input to the monitor) and e′ is called the output event (i.e., an event output
from the monitor).
13. ε denotes the set of all exchanges over E.
14. Metavariable x ranges over ε.
15. x1x2 · · ·xn, where xi ∈ ε, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, is called a finite execution over E.
16. x1x2 · · · , where xi ∈ ε, 1 ≤ i, is called an infinite execution over E.
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4.2 Design Principles
We believe that policies should not only be modular and freely composable with other
policies, but that the composition of these policies should not introduce nuances and sub-
tleties that make the resultant policy hierarchy difficult to reason about. Users should be
able to export well-formed policy hierarchies in a tool like PoliSeer and import them as
singular policies in yet more complex trees without worrying that organizational details in
the former will have unexpected consequences in the latter. In short, well-formed policy
trees should be totally encapsulated.
A violation of this principle can be illustrated with Polymer’s Disjunction and Con-
junction combinators, which generally output the least restrictive and most restrictive
output of their two sub-policies, respectively. Recall that Polymer policies receive a query
on each input action, and output a Suggestion that describes how execution should pro-
ceed. The InsSug(a) output is the first choice of both combinators because the original
input will be re-considered after action a is executed. Suppose subpolicies p1 and p2 output
InsSug(a) and InsSug(a′), respectively, Disjunction will output the left-hand suggestion
InsSug(a) only, even though InsSug(a′) is no more restrictive. This is because InsSug
values are parameterized over a single action and only one Suggestion can be output by
any single policy or combinator, so there is no way to actually combine the output of both
subpolicies. Conjunction behaves similarly, but consolidates the outputs if the inserted
actions are the same (i.e., a = a′)—the details of the consolidation are not essential to this
example.
Now, consider the simple composition Conjunction(Disjunction(p2, p1), p1). If a 6=
a′ in the outputs of p1 and p2, Disjunction will output InsSug(a′) and Conjunction
will choose Disjunction’s output, InsSug(a′), because the two actions are not equal. If
Disjunction were to output its right-hand suggestion instead, then Conjunction would
be consolidating two InsSug(a) values. Therefore, this arbitrary local decision on the part
of Disjunction impacts the behavior of higher-up policies (in this case, Conjunction),
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which is difficult to reason about. This problem is amplified when complex compositions
are collapsed into a single policy and these details are obscured.
Notice that the these basic Polymer combinators are not commutative when the sub-
policies suggest inserting different actions. Failure to satisfy simple algebraic properties
is a symptom of undesirable compositional behaviors. PoCo’s design is informed by the
following rules and guidelines, which we believe improve the policy-specification experience:
1. The basic combinators—conjunction, disjuction, and inversion—should exhibit de-
sirable algebraic properties such as:
(a) Conjunction and disjunction should be commutative, associative, and dis-
tribute over each other.
(b) Inversion should distribute over conjunction and disjunction (De Morgan’s
Laws).
(c) A doubly inverted policy should behave indistinguishably from the policy
itself.
2. Policies should be:
(a) free from externally observable effects as a consequence of the language de-
sign rather than by programming discipline.
(b) aware of all inputs to the monitor, not relying on combinators to pass infor-
mation down.
(c) explicit and complete, not leaving unhandled corner cases.
(d) decidable, permitting static analysis.
3. Policy outputs should:
(a) wholly capture a policy’s recommendations and prohibitions at once.
(b) be directly combinable with others to create a new output that combines
their meanings, distinct from each individual policy output.
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(c) be able to prohibit infinitely many events at once.
(d) be enforceable by some decision procedure.
Seeking to satisfy the above conditions ultimately results in the PoCo language, which
diverges significantly from Polymer. Improving the composability of policy outputs is a
large step toward meeting these goals. The definition of the policy outputs dictates the
combinators that are allowable on them, which impacts how base policies are specified and
composed.
4.3 Signed Regular Languages As Policy Outputs
Regular languages come close to meeting the above criteria for policy outputs. They are
closed under union, intersection, and complementation, so these natural combinators are
supported. These operations also exhibit desirable algebraic properties (e.g., commutative
disjunction). It can be decided whether some string is in a given regular language and,
given a regular language, a string member can be generated (unless the language is empty,
which is also decidable). Regular languages can also be infinite. However, regular languages
partition the set of all strings into only two categories: members and non-members. Our
purposes require three categories: positive members, non-members, and negative members,
which signify the desired, irrelevant, and prohibited output events, respectively.
Definition 3.1 (Signed Regular Languages). Let Σ be some alphabet and R be the set of
regular languages over it, then R± = {〈A+, A−〉 ∈ R×R, A+∩A− = ∅} is the set of signed
regular languages over Σ. That is, a signed regular language is a pair of disjoint regular
languages. Because  is not an event, it is assumed that  6∈ (A+ ∪ A−) throughout this
dissertation.
The language in which all strings are neutral (i.e., non-members) 〈∅, ∅〉 is called θ. θ
is an important value in PoCo that occurs frequently in policies. As a policy output, it is
similar to the Polymer’s IrrSug (“irrelevant suggestion”) value in that it expresses a lack
of both favor and disapproval.
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Definition 3.2 (Signed Language Membership). Let A = 〈A+, A−〉 be a signed regular
language and σ ∈ Σ+ be a string.
1. σ ∈+ A⇔ σ ∈ A+ (sim. σ 6∈+ A⇔ σ 6∈ A+)
2. σ ∈− A⇔ σ ∈ A− (sim. σ 6∈− A⇔ σ 6∈ A−)
3. σ ∈± A⇔ ((σ ∈+ A) ∨ (σ ∈− A)) (sim. σ 6∈± A⇔ ((σ 6∈+ A) ∧ (σ 6∈− A)))
Definition 3.3 (Signed Deterministic Finite Automata (SDFAs)). A signed DFAM± over
alphabet Σ is a pair of DFAs 〈M+ = 〈Σ, Q, q0 ∈ Q, δ : Q × Σ → Q,F ⊆ Q〉,M− =
〈Σ, Q′, q′0 ∈ Q′, δ′ : Q′ × Σ→ Q′, F ′ ⊆ Q′〉〉 such that L(M+) ∩ L(M−) = ∅, where
1. Q and Q′ are finite sets of states.
2. q0 and q
′
0 are initial states.
3. δ and δ′ are transition functions.
4. F and F ′ are final states.
M± is said to “positively accept” σ ∈ Σ+ when M+ accepts σ, and “negatively accept” σ
when M− accepts σ; otherwise, σ is “rejected”.
Note that the language of an SDFA—a pair of disjoint regular languages—is a signed reg-
ular language. Constructing an SDFA recognizing some signed regular language 〈A+, A−〉 is
a matter of pairing a DFA recognizing A+ with another DFA recognizing A−. The require-
ment that the positive and negative components of a signed regular language be disjoint is
a matter of consistency; no policy should both favor and prohibit any certain event at the
same time. This constraint drives the definition of the basic signed regular operations.
Definition 3.4 (Signed Regular Operations). Let A = 〈A+, A−〉 and B = 〈B+, B−〉 be
signed regular languages. The following operations are defined over them:
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Figure 4.2. Shaded diagrams of the signed regular operations.
A±B def= 〈A+ ∪B+, (A− ∪B−)r (A+ ∪B+)〉 (Optimistic Union)
A∓B def= 〈(A+ ∪B+)r (A− ∪B−), A− ∪B−〉 (Pessimistic Union)
A>B def= 〈A+ ∪B+, A− ∩B−〉 (Disjunction)
A⊥B def= 〈A+ ∩B+, A− ∪B−〉 (Conjunction)
¬A def= 〈A−, A+〉 (Inversion)
We can visualize the operations using a Venn-diagram-like technique in which the regions
that are positive and negative members of the result are shaded differently, and those that
are non-members of the result are unshaded. Figure 4.2 depicts the signed regular operations
in this form. The gap in the center of each diagram corresponds to the non-members of
both languages (i.e., (A+ ∪A−) ∩ (B+ ∪B−)).
The signed regular operations capture common strategies for combining the intents of
software-security policies. The ± and ∓ operations embody the desire to respect both the
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preferences and prohibitions of two policies; they differ in terms of whether preference or
prohibition is favored whenever there is some conflict between the two outputs. The ⊥
and > operations, on the other hand, combine only the prohibitions/preferences of their
operands, retaining only the preferences/prohibitions that they have in common. Finally,
the ¬ operation inverts policy intent by swapping preferences and prohibitions.
The compositional approach to policy specification is largely about avoiding the author-
ing of additional standalone policies. Instead, it is preferable to repurpose existing policies
via combination to achieve the desired result. We believe that our standard operations
constitute the most practically useful combination approaches, and enable, through combi-
nations of them, a rich set of composition strategies. The expressiveness of these operations
is the subject of Section 4.5.
It is important that policies should be closed under composition so that new policies
can be built from existing ones. Compositions should not behave differently from individ-
ual policies. Because PoCo policies output signed regular languages and their compositions
employ the signed regular operations, R± should be closed under these operations. Theo-
rem 3.1 proves that these operations, when applied to signed regular languages, result in
signed regular languages.
Theorem 3.1 (Closure of Signed Regular Languages). Let A = 〈A+, A−〉 and B =
〈B+, B−〉 be signed regular languages. The following languages are signed regular:
1. A±B
(a) Let X = A+ ∪B+ and Y = A− ∪B− (By assumption)
(b) A+, A−, B+, B− are regular (By def. of R±)
(c) A±B = 〈X,Y rX〉 (By (a) and def. of ±)
(d) X and Y are regular (By (a), (b), and closure of R under ∪)
(e) Y rX is regular (By (d) and closure of R under r)
(f) X ∩ (Y rX) = ∅ (Set algebra identity)
(g) 〈X,Y rX〉 is signed regular (By (d)–(f) and def. of R±)
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(h) Result follows from (c) and (g).
2. A∓B
(i) A∓B = 〈X r Y, Y 〉 (By (a) and def. of ±)
(j) X r Y is regular (By (d) and closure of R under r)
(k) Y ∩ (X r Y ) = ∅ (Set algebra identity)
(l) 〈X r Y, Y 〉 is signed regular (By (d), (j), (k), and def. of R±)
(m) Result follows from (i) and (l).
3. A⊥B
(n) A⊥B = 〈A+ ∩B+, Y 〉 (By (a) and def. of ⊥)
(o) A+ ∩B+ and Y are regular (By (a), (b), (d) and closure of R under ∩)
(p) A+ ∩B+ ∩ Y =
(A+ ∩B+ ∩A−) ∪ (A+ ∩B+ ∩B−) = ∅ (By (a), distribution, and def. of
R±)
(q) 〈A+ ∩B+, Y 〉 is signed regular (By (d), (o), (p), and def. of R±)
(r) Result follows from (n) and (q).
4. A>B
(s) A>B = 〈X,A− ∩B−〉 (By (a) and def. of >)
(t) X and A− ∩B− are regular (By (a), (b), (d), and closure of R under ∩)
(u) X ∩A− ∩B− =
(A+ ∩A− ∩B−) ∪ (B+ ∩A− ∩B−) = ∅ (By (a), distribution, and def. of
R±)
(v) 〈X,A− ∩B−〉 is signed regular (By (d), (t), (u), and def. of R±)
(w) Result follows from (s) and (v).
5. ¬A
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(x) Proof is immediate from the definition of ¬ and that A+ and A− remain
regular and disjoint as no operation is performed on them. 
Now that we have a closed system of values and operations, we are equipped to investi-
gate their properties in the following section.
4.4 Properties of Signed Regular Languages
We next evaluate the signed regular languages and operations by exploring the properties
they satisfy. This collection of algebraic identities serves as both a toolbox for policy authors
and a sanity check on the operation definitions. Some of these properties can be applied
as optimizations, reducing the overall number of operations performed. Furthermore, these
properties establish the signed regular languages under subsets of the operations as instances
of various algebraic structures. This ties our system to results from abstract algebra, from
which it can be further understood.
Theorem 4.2 (Algebraic Properties of Signed Regular languages). Let A = 〈A+, A−〉,
B = 〈B+, B−〉, and C = 〈C+, C−〉 be signed regular languages. The following equivalences
hold:
1. ± is commutative: A±B = B ±A
Proof : A±B = B ±A
≡ 〈A+ ∪B+, (A− ∪B−)r (A+ ∪B+)〉 = 〈B+ ∪A+, (B− ∪A−)r (B+ ∪A+)〉
(Def. of ±)
≡ 〈A+ ∪B+, (A− ∪B−)r (A+ ∪B+)〉 = 〈A+ ∪B+, (A− ∪B−)r (A+ ∪B+)〉
(∪ commutative)

2. ∓ is commutative: A∓B = B ∓A
Proof : A∓B = B ∓A
≡ 〈(A+ ∪B+)r (A− ∪B−), (A− ∪B−)〉 = 〈(B+ ∪A+)r (B− ∪A−), (B− ∪A−)〉
(Def. of ±)
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≡ 〈(A+ ∪B+)r (A− ∪B−), (A− ∪B−)〉 = 〈(A+ ∪B+)r (A− ∪B−), (A− ∪B−)〉
(∪ commutative)

3. ⊥ is commutative: A⊥B = B⊥A
Proof : A⊥B = B⊥A
≡ 〈A+ ∩B+, A− ∪B−〉 = 〈B+ ∩A+, B− ∪A−〉 (Def. of ⊥)
≡ 〈A+ ∩B+, A− ∪B−〉 = 〈A+ ∩B+, A− ∪B−〉 (∪,∩ commutative)

4. > is commutative: A>B = B>A
Proof : A>B = B>A
≡ 〈A+ ∪B+, A− ∩B−〉 = 〈B+ ∪A+, B− ∩A−〉 (Def. of >)
≡ 〈A+ ∪B+, A− ∩B−〉 = 〈A+ ∪B+, A− ∩B−〉 (∪,∩ commutative)

5. ± is associative: A± (B ± C) = (A±B)± C
Proof : A± (B ± C) = (A±B)± C
≡ 〈A+ ∪ (B+ ∪ C+), (A− ∪ ((B− ∪ C−)r (B+ ∪ C+)))r (A+ ∪ (B+ ∪ C+))〉 =
〈(A+ ∪B+) ∪C+, (((A− ∪B−)r (A+ ∪B+)) ∪C−)r ((A+ ∪B+) ∪C+)〉(Def. of
±)
≡ 〈A+ ∪ (B+ ∪ C+), (A− ∪ ((B− ∪ C−)r (B+ ∪ C+)))r (A+ ∪ (B+ ∪ C+))〉 =
〈A+ ∪ (B+ ∪ C+), (((A− ∪B−)r (A+ ∪B+)) ∪ C−)r (A+ ∪ (B+ ∪ C+))〉
(∪ associative)
≡ A− ∪ ((B− ∪ C−)r (B+ ∪ C+)))r (A+ ∪ (B+ ∪ C+)) =
(((A− ∪B−)r (A+ ∪B+)) ∪ C−)r (A+ ∪ (B+ ∪ C+))
(First part of tuple finished, omit)
≡ (A− ∪ ((B− ∪ C−) ∩ (B+ ∪ C+))) ∩ (A+ ∪ (B+ ∪ C+)) =
(((A− ∪B−) ∩ (A+ ∪B+)) ∪ C−) ∩ (A+ ∪ (B+ ∪ C+)) (X r Y = X ∩ Y )
≡ (A− ∪ ((B− ∩ (B+ ∪ C+)) ∪ (C− ∩ (B+ ∪ C+)))) ∩ (A+ ∪ (B+ ∪ C+)) =
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(((A− ∩ (A+ ∪B+))∪ (B− ∩ (A+ ∪B+)))∪C−)∩ (A+ ∪ (B+ ∪ C+))(Distribute)
≡ (A− ∪ ((B− ∩ (B+ ∩ C+)) ∪ (C− ∩ (B+ ∩ C+)))) ∩ (A+ ∩ (B+ ∩ C+)) =
(((A−∩ (A+∩B+))∪ (B−∩ (A+∩B+)))∪C−)∩ (A+∩ (B+∩C+))(X ∪ Y = X∩Y )
≡ (A− ∪ (B− ∩ C+) ∪ (C− ∩B+)) ∩ (A+ ∩B+ ∩ C+) =
((A− ∩B+) ∪ (B− ∩A+) ∪ C−) ∩ (A+ ∩B+ ∩ C+) (X− ∩X+ = X−)
≡ (A−∩A+∩B+∩C+)∪ (B−∩C+∩A+∩B+∩C+)∪ (C−∩B+∩A+∩B+∩C+) =
(A− ∩B+ ∩A+ ∩B+ ∩C+) ∪ (B− ∩A+ ∩A+ ∩B+ ∩C+) ∪ (C− ∩A+ ∩B+ ∩C+)
(Distribute)
≡ (A− ∩A+ ∩B+ ∩ C+) ∪ (B− ∩A+ ∩B+ ∩ C+) ∪ (C− ∩A+ ∩B+ ∩ C+) =
(A− ∩A+ ∩B+ ∩C+)∪ (B− ∩A+ ∩B+ ∩C+)∪ (C− ∩A+ ∩B+ ∩C+)(X ∩X = X)

6. ∓ is associative: A∓ (B ∓ C) = (A∓B)∓ C
Proof : A∓ (B ∓ C) = (A∓B)∓ C
≡ 〈(A+ ∪ ((B+ ∪ C+)r (B− ∪ C−)))r (A− ∪ (B− ∪ C−)), A− ∪ (B− ∪ C−)〉 =
〈(((A+ ∪B+)r (A− ∪B−)) ∪C+)r ((A− ∪B−) ∪C−), (A− ∪B−) ∪C−〉(Def. of
∓)
≡ 〈(A+ ∪ ((B+ ∪ C+)r (B− ∪ C−)))r (A− ∪ (B− ∪ C−)), (A− ∪B−) ∪ C−)〉 =
〈(((A+ ∪B+)r (A− ∪B−)) ∪ C+)r ((A− ∪B−) ∪ C−), (A− ∪B−) ∪ C−〉
(∪ associative)
≡ (A+ ∪ ((B+ ∪ C+)r (B− ∪ C−)))r (A− ∪ (B− ∪ C−)) =
(((A+ ∪B+)r (A− ∪B−)) ∪ C+)r ((A− ∪B−) ∪ C−)
(Second part of tuple finished, omit)
≡ (A+ ∪ ((B+ ∪ C+) ∩ (B− ∪ C−))) ∩ (A− ∪B− ∪ C−) =
(((A+ ∪B+) ∩ (A− ∪B−)) ∪ C+) ∩ (A− ∪B− ∪ C−) (X r Y = X ∩ Y )
≡ (A+ ∪ ((B+ ∩ (B− ∪ C−)) ∪ (C+ ∩ (B− ∪ C−)))) ∩ (A− ∪B− ∪ C−) =
(((A+ ∩ (A− ∪B−)) ∪ (B+ ∩ (A− ∪B−))) ∪ C+) ∩ (A− ∪B− ∪ C−) (Distribute)
≡ (A+ ∪ (B+ ∩B− ∩ C−) ∪ (C+ ∩B− ∩ C−)) ∩ (A− ∩B− ∩ C−) =
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((A+ ∩A− ∩B−) ∪ (B+ ∩A− ∩B−) ∪ C+) ∩ (A− ∩B− ∩ C−) (X ∪ Y = X ∩ Y )
≡ (A+ ∪ (B+ ∩ C−) ∪ (C+ ∩B−)) ∩ (A− ∩B− ∩ C−) =
((A+ ∩B−) ∪ (B+ ∩A−) ∪ C+) ∩ (A− ∩B− ∩ C−) (X+ ∩X− = X+)
≡ (A+∩A−∩B−∩C−)∪ (B+∩C−∩A−∩B−∩C−)∪ (C+∩B−∩A−∩B−∩C−) =
(A+ ∩B− ∩A− ∩B− ∩C−) ∪ (B+ ∩A− ∩A− ∩B− ∩C−) ∪ (C+ ∩A− ∩B− ∩C−)
(Distribute)
≡ (A+ ∩A− ∩B− ∩ C−) ∪ (B+ ∩A− ∩B− ∩ C−) ∪ (C+ ∩A− ∩B− ∩ C−) =
(A+ ∩A− ∩B− ∩C−)∪ (B+ ∩A− ∩B− ∩C−)∪ (C+ ∩A− ∩B− ∩C−)(X ∪X = X)

7. ⊥ is associative: A⊥(B⊥C) = (A⊥B)⊥C
Proof : A⊥(B⊥C) = (A⊥B)⊥C
≡ 〈A+, A−〉⊥〈B+ ∩ C+, B− ∪ C−〉 = 〈A+ ∩B+, A− ∪B−〉⊥〈C+, C−〉 (Def. of ⊥)
≡ 〈A+ ∩B+ ∩C+, A− ∪B− ∪C−〉 = 〈A+ ∩B+ ∩C+, A− ∪B− ∪C−〉(Def. of ⊥)

8. > is associative: A>(B>C) = (A>B)>C
Proof : A>(B>C) = (A>B)>C
≡ 〈A+, A−〉>〈B+ ∪ C+, B− ∩ C−〉 = 〈A+ ∪B+, A− ∩B−〉>〈C+, C−〉 (Def. of >)
≡ 〈A+ ∪B+ ∪C+, A− ∩B− ∩C−〉 = 〈A+ ∪B+ ∪C+, A− ∩B− ∩C−〉(Def. of >)

9. ¬ is involutary: ¬(¬A) = A
Proof : ¬(¬A) = A
≡ ¬〈A−, A+〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (Def. of ¬)
≡ 〈A+, A−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (Def. of ¬)

10. De Morgan’s Law (±): ¬(A±B) = (¬A)∓ (¬B)
Proof : ¬(A±B) = (¬A)∓ (¬B)
≡ ¬〈A+ ∪B+, (A− ∪B−)r (A+ ∪B+)〉 = (¬〈A+, A−〉)∓ (¬〈B+, B−〉)(Def. of ±)
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≡ 〈(A− ∪B−)r (A+ ∪B+), A+ ∪B+〉 = 〈A−, A+〉 ∓ 〈B−, B+〉 (Def. of ¬)
≡ 〈(A− ∪B−)r (A+ ∪B+), A+ ∪B+〉 = 〈(A− ∪B−)r (A+ ∪B+), A+ ∪B+〉
(Def. of ∓)

11. De Morgan’s Law (∓): ¬(A∓B) = (¬A)± (¬B)
Proof : ¬(A∓B) = (¬A)± (¬B)
≡ ¬〈(A+ ∪B+)r (A− ∪B−), A− ∪B−〉 = (¬〈A+, A−〉)± (¬〈B+, B−〉)(Def. of ∓)
≡ 〈A− ∪B−, (A+ ∪B+)r (A− ∪B−)〉 = 〈A−, A+〉 ± 〈B−, B+〉 (Def. of ¬)
≡ 〈A− ∪B−, (A+ ∪B+)r (A− ∪B−)〉 = 〈A− ∪B−, (A+ ∪B+)r (A− ∪B−)〉
(Def. of ±)

12. De Morgan’s Law (⊥): ¬(A⊥B) = (¬A)>(¬B)
Proof : ≡ ¬〈A+ ∩B+, A− ∪B−〉 = (¬〈A+, A−〉)>(¬〈B+, B−〉) (Def. of ⊥)
≡ 〈A− ∪B−, A+ ∩B+〉 = 〈A−, A+〉>〈B−, B+〉 (Def. of ¬)
≡ 〈A− ∪B−, A+ ∩B+〉 = 〈A− ∪B−, A+ ∩B+〉 (Def. of >)

13. De Morgan’s Law (>): ¬(A>B) = (¬A)⊥(¬B)
Proof : ¬(A>B) = (¬A)⊥(¬B)
≡ ¬〈A+ ∪B+, A− ∩B−〉 = (¬〈A+, A−〉)⊥(¬〈B+, B−〉) (Def. of >)
≡ 〈A− ∩B−, A+ ∪B+〉 = 〈A−, A+〉⊥〈B−, B+〉 (Def. of ¬)
≡ 〈A− ∩B−, A+ ∪B+〉 = 〈A− ∩B−, A+ ∪B+〉 (Def. of ⊥)

14. ± = ∓ for non-conflicting operands: (A+∩B− = ∅∧B+∩A− = ∅)⇒ (A∓B = A±B)
Proof : (A∓B = A±B)
≡ 〈(A+ ∪B+)r (A− ∪B−), (A− ∪B−)〉 = 〈A+ ∪B+, (A− ∪B−)r (A+ ∪B+)〉
(Def. of ∓,±)
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≡ 〈(A+ ∪B+) ∩ (A− ∪B−), (A− ∪B−)〉 = 〈A+ ∪B+, (A− ∪B−) ∩ (A+ ∪B+)〉
(X r Y = X ∩ Y )
≡ 〈(A+∪B+)∩A−∩B−, (A−∪B−)〉 = 〈A+∪B+, (A−∪B−)∩A+∩B+〉(X ∪ Y =
X ∩ Y )
≡ 〈(A+ ∩A− ∩B−) ∪ (B+ ∩A− ∩B−), A− ∪B−〉 =
〈A+ ∪B+, (A− ∩A+ ∩B+) ∪ (B− ∩A+ ∩B+)〉 (Distribute)
≡ 〈A+ ∪B+, A− ∪B−〉 = 〈A+ ∪B+, A− ∪B−〉 (X ∩ Y = ∅ ⇒ X ∩ Y = X)

15. θ is an identity element for ∓: A∓ θ = A
Proof : A∓ θ = A
≡ 〈(A+ ∪ ∅)r (A− ∪ ∅), A− ∪ ∅〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (Def. of ∓)
≡ 〈A+ rA−, A−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (X ∪ ∅ = X)
≡ 〈A+, A−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (A+ ∩A− = ∅ ⇒ A+ rA− = A+)

16. θ is an identity element for ±: A± θ = A
This result follows from Theorem 4.2.14 and Theorem 4.2.15.
17. 〈Σ+, ∅〉 is an identity element for ⊥: 〈Σ+, ∅〉⊥A = A
Proof : 〈Σ+, ∅〉⊥A = A
≡ 〈Σ+ ∩A+, ∅ ∪A−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (Def. of ⊥)
≡ 〈A+, A−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (A+ ⊆ Σ+, ∅ ∪X = X)

18. 〈∅,Σ+〉 is an identity element for >: 〈∅,Σ+〉>A = A
Proof : 〈∅,Σ+〉>A = A
≡ 〈∅ ∪A+,Σ+ ∩A−〉> = 〈A+, A−〉 (Def. of >)
≡ 〈A+, A−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (∅ ∪X = X,A− ⊆ Σ+)

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19. 〈∅,Σ+〉 is an absorbing element for ⊥: 〈∅,Σ+〉⊥A = 〈∅,Σ+〉
Proof : 〈∅,Σ+〉⊥A = 〈∅,Σ+〉
≡ 〈∅ ∩A+,Σ+ ∪A−〉 = 〈∅,Σ+〉 (Def. of ⊥)
≡ 〈∅,Σ+〉 = 〈∅,Σ+〉 (∅ ∩X = ∅, A− ⊆ Σ+)

20. 〈Σ+, ∅〉 is an absorbing element for >: 〈Σ+, ∅〉>A = 〈Σ+, ∅〉
Proof : 〈Σ+, ∅〉>A = 〈Σ+, ∅〉
≡ 〈Σ+ ∪A+, ∅ ∩A−〉 = 〈Σ+, ∅〉 (Def. of >)
≡ 〈Σ+, ∅〉 = 〈Σ+, ∅〉 (A+ ⊆ Σ+, ∅ ∩X = ∅)

21. ± is idempotent: A±A = A
Proof : A±A = A
≡ 〈A+ ∪A+, (A− ∪A−)r (A+ ∪A+)〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (Def. of ±)
≡ 〈A+, A− rA+〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (X ∪X = X)
≡ 〈A+, A−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (X ∩ Y = ∅ ⇒ (X r Y = X))

22. ∓ is idempotent: A∓A = A
Proof : A∓A = A
≡ 〈(A+ ∪A+)r (A− ∪A−), A− ∪A−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (Def. of ∓)
≡ 〈A+ rA−, A−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (X ∪X = X)
≡ 〈A+, A−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (X ∩ Y = ∅ ⇒ (X r Y = X))

23. > is idempotent: A>A = A
Proof : A>A = A
≡ 〈A+ ∪A+, A− ∩A−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (Def. of >)
≡ 〈A+, A−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (X ∪X = X,Y ∩ Y = Y )

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24. ⊥ is idempotent: A⊥A = A
Proof : A⊥A = A
≡ 〈A+ ∩A+, A− ∪A−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (Def. of ⊥)
≡ 〈A+, A−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (X ∪X = X,Y ∩ Y = Y )

25. ⊥ distributes over ∓: A⊥(B ∓ C) = (A⊥B)∓ (A⊥C)
Proof : A⊥(B ∓ C) = (A⊥B)∓ (A⊥C)
≡ 〈A+, A−〉⊥〈(B+ ∪ C+)r (B− ∪ C−), B− ∪ C−〉 =
(〈A+, A−〉⊥〈B+, B−〉)∓ (〈A+, A−〉⊥〈C+, C−〉) (Def. of ∓)
≡ 〈A+, A−〉⊥〈(B+ ∪ C+) ∩ (B− ∪ C−), B− ∪ C−〉 =
(〈A+, A−〉⊥〈B+, B−〉)∓ (〈A+, A−〉⊥〈C+, C−〉) (X r Y = X ∩ Y )
≡ 〈A+, A−〉⊥〈(B+ ∪ C+) ∩ (B− ∩ C−), B− ∪ C−〉 =
(〈A+, A−〉⊥〈B+, B−〉)∓ (〈A+, A−〉⊥〈C+, C−〉) (X ∪ Y = X ∩ Y )
≡ 〈A+, A−〉⊥〈(B+ ∩B− ∩ C−) ∪ (C+ ∩B− ∩ C−), B− ∪ C−〉 =
(〈A+, A−〉⊥〈B+, B−〉)∓ (〈A+, A−〉⊥〈C+, C−〉) (Distribute)
≡ 〈A+, A−〉⊥〈(B+ ∩ C−) ∪ (C+ ∩B−), B− ∪ C−〉 =
(〈A+, A−〉⊥〈B+, B−〉)∓ (〈A+, A−〉⊥〈C+, C−〉) (X+ ∩X− = X+)
≡ 〈A+ ∩ ((B+ ∩ C−) ∪ (C+ ∩B−)), A− ∪B− ∪ C−〉 =
〈A+ ∩B+, A− ∪B−〉 ∓ 〈A+ ∩ C+, A− ∪ C−〉 (Def. of ⊥)
≡ 〈(A+ ∩B+ ∩ C−) ∪ (A+ ∩ C+ ∩B−), A− ∪B− ∪ C−〉 =
〈A+ ∩B+, A− ∪B−〉 ∓ 〈A+ ∩ C+, A− ∪ C−〉 (Distribute)
≡ 〈(A+ ∩B+ ∩ C−) ∪ (A+ ∩ C+ ∩B−), A− ∪B− ∪ C−〉 =
〈((A+ ∩B+) ∪ (A+ ∩ C+))r (A− ∪B− ∪A− ∪ C−), A− ∪B− ∪A− ∪ C−〉 (Def of
∓) ≡ 〈(A+ ∩B+ ∩ C−) ∪ (A+ ∩ C+ ∩B−), A− ∪B− ∪ C−〉 =
〈((A+ ∩B+) ∪ (A+ ∩ C+))r (A− ∪B− ∪ C−), A− ∪B− ∪ C−〉 (X ∪X = X)
≡ (A+∩B+∩C−)∪ (A+∩C+∩B−) = ((A+∩B+)∪ (A+∩C+))r (A−∪B−∪C−)
(Second part of tuple finished, omit)
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≡ (A+∩B+∩C−)∪ (A+∩C+∩B−) = ((A+∩B+)∪ (A+∩C+))∩ (A− ∪B− ∪ C−)
(X r Y = X ∩ Y )
≡ (A+ ∩B+ ∩ C−) ∪ (A+ ∩ C+ ∩B−) =
((A+ ∩B+ ∩A− ∩B− ∩ C−) ∪ (A+ ∩ C+ ∩A− ∩B− ∩ C−)) (Distribute)
≡ (A+ ∩B+ ∩ C−) ∪ (A+ ∩ C+ ∩B−) = (A+ ∩B+ ∩ C−) ∪ (A+ ∩ C+ ∩B−)
(X+ ∩X− = X+)

26. ∓ distributes over ⊥: A∓ (B⊥C) = (A∓B)⊥(A∓ C)
Proof : A∓ (B⊥C) = (A∓B)⊥(A∓ C)
≡ 〈A+, A−〉∓〈B+∩C+, B−∪C−〉 = (〈A+, A−〉∓〈B+, B−〉)⊥(〈A+, A−〉∓〈C+, C−〉)
(Def. of ⊥)
≡ 〈(A+ ∪ (B+ ∩ C+))r (A− ∪B− ∪ C−), A− ∪B− ∪ C−〉 =
〈(A+ ∪B+)r (A− ∪B−), A− ∪B−〉⊥〈(A+ ∪ C+)r (A− ∪ C−), A− ∪ C−〉
(Def. of ∓)
≡ 〈(A+ ∪ (B+ ∩ C+))r (A− ∪B− ∪ C−), A− ∪B− ∪ C−〉 =
〈((A+ ∪B+)r (A− ∪B−)) ∩ ((A+ ∪ C+)r (A− ∪ C−)), A− ∪B− ∪A− ∪ C−〉
(Def. of ⊥)
≡ 〈(A+ ∪ (B+ ∩ C+))r (A− ∪B− ∪ C−), A− ∪B− ∪ C−〉 =
〈((A+ ∪B+)r (A− ∪B−)) ∩ ((A+ ∪ C+)r (A− ∪ C−)), A− ∪B− ∪ C−〉
(X ∪X = X)
≡ (A+ ∪ (B+ ∩ C+))r (A− ∪B− ∪ C−) =
((A+ ∪B+)r (A− ∪B−)) ∩ ((A+ ∪ C+)r (A− ∪ C−))
(Second part of tuple finished, omit)
≡ (A+ ∪ (B+ ∩ C+)) ∩ (A− ∪B− ∪ C−) =
((A+ ∪B+) ∩ (A− ∪B−)) ∩ ((A+ ∪ C+) ∩ (A− ∪ C−)) (X r Y = X ∩ Y )
≡ (A+∪ (B+∩C+))∩A−∩B−∩C− = (A+∪B+)∩A−∩B−∩ (A+∪C+)∩A−∩C−
(X ∪ Y = X ∩ Y )
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≡ (A+ ∪ (B+ ∩ C+)) ∩A− ∩B− ∩ C− = (A+ ∪B+) ∩A− ∩B− ∩ (A+ ∪ C+) ∩ C−
(X ∩X = X)
≡ (A+∪B+)∩ (A+∪C+)∩A−∩B−∩C− = (A+∪B+)∩ (A+∪C+)∩A−∩B−∩C−
(Distribute, ∩ commutative)

27. > distributes over ±: A>(B ± C) = (A>B)± (A>C)
Proof : A>(B ± C) = (A>B)± (A>C)
≡ 〈A+, A−〉>(〈B+ ∪ C+, (B− ∪ C−)r (B+ ∪ C+)〉) =
(〈A+, A−〉>〈B+, B−〉)± (〈A+, A−〉>〈C+, C−〉) (Def. of ±)
≡ 〈A+ ∪B+ ∪ C+, A− ∩ ((B− ∪ C−)r (B+ ∪ C+))〉 =
〈A+ ∪B+, A− ∩B−〉 ± 〈A+ ∪ C+, A− ∩ C−〉 (Def. of >)
≡ 〈A+ ∪B+ ∪ C+, A− ∩ ((B− ∪ C−)r (B+ ∪ C+))〉 =
〈A+ ∪B+ ∪A+ ∪ C+, ((A− ∩B−) ∪ (A− ∩ C−))r (A+ ∪B+ ∪A+ ∪ C+)〉
(Def. of ±)
≡ 〈A+ ∪B+ ∪ C+, A− ∩ ((B− ∪ C−)r (B+ ∪ C+))〉 =
〈A+ ∪B+ ∪ C+, ((A− ∩B−) ∪ (A− ∩ C−))r (A+ ∪B+ ∪ C+)〉 (X ∪X = X)
≡ A− ∩ ((B− ∪ C−)r (B+ ∪ C+)) = ((A− ∩B−) ∪ (A− ∩ C−))r (A+ ∪B+ ∪ C+)
(First part of tuple finished, omit)
≡ A− ∩ (B− ∪ C−) ∩ (B+ ∪ C+) = ((A− ∩B−) ∪ (A− ∩ C−)) ∩ (A+ ∪B+ ∪ C+)
(X r Y = X ∩ Y )
≡ A− ∩B+ ∩ C+ ∩ (B− ∪ C−) = ((A− ∩B−) ∪ (A− ∩ C−)) ∩A+ ∩B+ ∩ C+
(X ∪ Y = X ∩ Y , ∩ commutative)
≡ (A− ∩B+ ∩ C+ ∩B−) ∪ (A− ∩B+ ∩ C+ ∩ C−) =
(A− ∩B− ∩A+ ∩B+ ∩ C+) ∪ (A− ∩ C− ∩A+ ∩B+ ∩ C+) (Distribute)
≡ (A− ∩B− ∩ C+) ∪ (A− ∩B+ ∩ C−) = (A− ∩B− ∩ C+) ∪ (A− ∩B+ ∩ C−)
(X+ ∩X− = X−, ∩ commutative)

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28. ± distributes over >: A± (B>C) = (A±B)>(A± C)
Proof : A± (B>C) = (A±B)>(A± C)
≡ 〈A+, A−〉±〈B+∪C+, B−∩C−〉 = (〈A+, A−〉±〈B+, B−〉)>(〈A+, A−〉±〈C+, C−〉)
(Def. of >)
≡ 〈A+ ∪B+ ∪ C+, (A− ∪ (B− ∩ C−))r (A+ ∪B+ ∪ C+)〉 =
〈A+ ∪B+, (A− ∪B−)r (A+ ∪B+)〉>〈A+ ∪C+, (A− ∪C−)r (A+ ∪C+)〉(Def. of
±)
≡ 〈A+ ∪B+ ∪ C+, (A− ∪ (B− ∩ C−))r (A+ ∪B+ ∪ C+)〉 =
〈A+ ∪B+ ∪A+ ∪ C+, ((A− ∪B−)r (A+ ∪B+)) ∩ ((A− ∪ C−)r (A+ ∪ C+))〉
(Def. of >)
≡ 〈A+ ∪B+ ∪ C+, (A− ∪ (B− ∩ C−))r (A+ ∪B+ ∪ C+)〉 =
〈A+∪B+∪C+, ((A−∪B−)r (A+∪B+))∩ ((A−∪C−)r (A+∪C+))〉(X ∪X = X)
≡ (A− ∪ (B− ∩ C−))r (A+ ∪B+ ∪ C+) =
((A− ∪B−)r (A+ ∪B+)) ∩ ((A− ∪ C−)r (A+ ∪ C+))
(First part of tuple finished, omit)
≡ (A− ∪ (B− ∩ C−)) ∩ (A+ ∪B+ ∪ C+) =
((A− ∪B−) ∩ (A+ ∪B+)) ∩ ((A− ∪ C−) ∩ (A+ ∪ C+)) (X r Y = X ∩ Y )
≡ (A−∪ (B−∩C−))∩A+∩B+∩C+ = (A−∪B−)∩ (A−∪C−)∩A+∩B+∩A+∩C+
(X ∪ Y = X ∩ Y , ∩ commutative)
≡ (A−∪B−)∩ (A−∪C−)∩A+∩B+∩C+ = (A−∪B−)∩ (A−∪C−)∩A+∩B+∩C+
(X ∩X = X,Distribute)

29. Absorption for > over ⊥: A>(A⊥B) = A
Proof : A>(A⊥B) = A
≡ 〈A+, A−〉>〈A+ ∩B+, A− ∪B−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (Def. of ⊥)
≡ 〈A+ ∪ (A+ ∩B+), A− ∩ (A− ∪B−)〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (Def. of >)
≡ 〈A+, A− ∩ (A− ∪B−)〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (Y ⊆ X ⇒ X ∪ Y = X)
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≡ 〈A+, A−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (X ⊆ Y ⇒ X ∩ Y = X)

30. Absorption for ⊥ over >: A⊥(A>B) = A
Proof : A⊥(A>B) = A
≡ 〈A+, A−〉⊥〈A+ ∪B+, A− ∩B−〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (Def. of >)
≡ 〈A+ ∩ (A+ ∪B+), A− ∪ (A− ∩B−)〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (Def. of ⊥)
≡ 〈A+, A− ∪ (A− ∩B−)〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (X ⊆ Y ⇒ X ∩ Y = X)
≡ 〈A+, A− ∪ (A− ∩B−)〉 = 〈A+, A−〉 (Y ⊆ X ⇒ X ∪ Y = X)

31. > distributes over ⊥: A>(B⊥C) = (A>B)⊥(A>C)
Proof : A>(B⊥C) = (A>B)⊥(A>C)
≡ 〈A+, A−〉>〈B+∩C+, B−∪C−〉 = (〈A+, A−〉>〈B+, B−〉)⊥(〈A+, A−〉>〈C+, C−〉)
(Def. of ⊥)
≡ 〈A+ ∪ (B+ ∩C+), A− ∩ (B− ∪C−)〉 = 〈A+ ∪B+, A− ∩B−〉⊥〈A+ ∪C+, A− ∩C−〉
(Def. of >)
≡ 〈A+ ∪ (B+ ∩ C+), A− ∩ (B− ∪ C−)〉 =
〈(A+ ∪B+) ∩ (A+ ∪ C+), (A− ∩B−) ∪ (A− ∩ C−)〉 (Def. of ⊥)
≡ 〈(A+ ∪B+) ∩ (A+ ∪ C+), (A− ∩B−) ∪ (A− ∩ C−)〉 =
〈(A+ ∪B+) ∩ (A+ ∪ C+), (A− ∩B−) ∪ (A− ∩ C−)〉 (Distribute)

32. ⊥ distributes over >: A⊥(B>C) = (A⊥B)>(A⊥C)
Proof : A⊥(B>C) = (A⊥B)>(A⊥C)
≡ 〈A+, A−〉⊥〈B+∪C+, B−∩C−〉 = (〈A+, A−〉⊥〈B+, B−〉)>(〈A+, A−〉⊥〈C+, C−〉)
(Def. of >)
≡ 〈A+ ∩ (B+ ∪C+), A− ∪ (B− ∩C−)〉 = 〈A+ ∩B+, A− ∪B−〉>〈A+ ∩C+, A− ∪C−〉
(Def. of ⊥)
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≡ 〈A+∩(B+∪C+), A−∪(B−∩C−)〉 = 〈(A+∩B+)∪(A+∩C+), (A−∪B−)∩(A−∪C−)〉
(Def. of >)
≡ 〈(A+ ∩B+) ∪ (A+ ∩ C+), (A− ∪B−) ∩ (A− ∪ C−)〉 =
〈(A+ ∩B+) ∪ (A+ ∩ C+), (A− ∪B−) ∩ (A− ∪ C−)〉 (Distribute)

Theorem 3.1 and Theorem 4.2 assist in characterizing the signed regular languages and
operations in terms of abstract algebra.
Definition 4.5 (Commutative Semigroup [14]). A pair 〈G, ◦〉, where G is a set and ◦ is a
binary operation, is a commutative semigroup if all of the following hold:
1. Closure: ∀a, b ∈ G : (a ◦ b) ∈ G.
2. Associativity: ∀a, b, c ∈ G : a ◦ (b ◦ c) = (a ◦ b) ◦ c.
3. Commutativity: ∀a, b ∈ G : a ◦ b = b ◦ a.
Note that 〈G, ◦〉 satisfying all of the above except commutativity is called a “semigroup”.
Definition 4.6 (Commutative Monoid [14]). A triple 〈G, ◦, eg〉, where eg ∈ G is a commu-
tative monoid if all of the following hold:
1. 〈G, ◦〉 is a commutative semigroup.
2. Identity: ∀a ∈ G : a ◦ eg = a
That is, (commutative) monoids simply extend (commutative) semigroups with an iden-
tity element. We now prove that the four basic binary signed regular operations are com-
mutative monoids with respect to the set of all signed regular languages.
Theorem 4.3 (〈R±,±, θ〉 is a commutative monoid).
Proof : 〈R±,±, θ〉 satisfies Definition 4.6.
1. R± is closed under ±. (By Theorem 3.1)
2. ± is associative for elements of R±. (By Theorem 4.2.5)
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3. ± is commutative for elements of R±. (By Theorem 4.2.1)
4. θ is an identity element of ± on R±. (By Theorem 4.2.16)

Theorem 4.4 (〈R±,∓, θ〉 is a commutative monoid).
Proof : 〈R±,∓, θ〉 satisfies Definition 4.6.
1. R± is closed under ∓. (By Theorem 3.1)
2. ∓ is associative for elements of R±. (By Theorem 4.2.6)
3. ∓ is commutative for elements of R±. (By Theorem 4.2.2)
4. θ is an identity element of ∓ on R±. (By Theorem 4.2.15)

Theorem 4.5 (〈R±,>, 〈∅,Σ+〉〉 is a commutative monoid).
Proof : 〈R±,>, 〈∅,Σ+〉〉 satisfies Definition 4.6.
1. R± is closed under >. (By Theorem 3.1)
2. > is associative for elements of R±. (By Theorem 4.2.8)
3. > is commutative for elements of R±. (By Theorem 4.2.4)
4. 〈∅,Σ+〉 is an identity element of > on R±. (By Theorem 4.2.18)

Theorem 4.6 (〈R±,⊥, 〈Σ+, ∅〉〉 is a commutative monoid).
Proof : 〈R±,⊥, 〈∅,Σ+〉〉 satisfies Definition 4.6.
1. R± is closed under ⊥. (By Theorem 3.1)
2. ⊥ is associative for elements of R±. (By Theorem 4.2.7)
3. ⊥ is commutative for elements of R±. (By Theorem 4.2.3)
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4. 〈Σ+, ∅〉 is an identity element of ⊥ on R±. (By Theorem 4.2.17)

Definition 4.7 (Rig [15]). A triple 〈G,+, ∗〉 is a rig if all of the following hold:
1. 〈G,+, 0〉 is a commutative monoid.
2. 〈G, ∗〉 is a semigroup
3. Distributivity of ∗ over +: ∀a, b, c ∈ G : a ∗ (b+ c) = (a ∗ b) + (a ∗ c) = (b+ c) ∗ a.
* Note that this definition of rig is derived by simply dropping the negativity condition
(∀a ∈ G : ∃a−1 ∈ G : a + a−1 = 0) from the definition of a ring. Some definitions
of rigs insist that 0 is an absorbing element for ∗ (i.e., ∀a ∈ G : a ∗ 0 = 0 ∗ a = 0),
but [15] reserves the term hemiring for such a structure.
Theorem 4.7 (〈R±,∓,⊥, 〉 is a rig).
Proof : 〈R±,∓,⊥, 〉 satisfies Definition 4.7.
1. 〈R±,∓, θ〉 is a commutative monoid. (By Theorem 4.4)
2. 〈R±,⊥〉 is a semigroup. (Subsumed by Theorem 4.6)
3. ⊥ distributes over ∓ for elements of R±. (By Theorem 4.2.25 and Theorem 4.2.3)
* Observe that 〈R±,⊥,∓, 〉 is also a rig. The commutative monoid and semigroup
conditions are still satisfied by the given theorems and ∓ distributes over ⊥ by
Theorem 4.2.26 and Theorem 4.2.2. 
Theorem 4.8 (〈R±,±,>, 〉 is a rig).
Proof :〈R±,±,>, 〉 satisfies Definition 4.7.
1. 〈R±,±, θ〉 is a commutative semigroup. (Subsumed by Theorem 4.3)
2. 〈R±,>〉 is a semigroup. (Subsumed by Theorem 4.5)
3. ⊥ distributes over ∓ for elements of R±. (By Theorem 4.2.27 and Theorem 4.2.4)
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* Observe that 〈R±,>,±, 〉 is also a rig. The commutative monoid and semigroup
conditions are still satisfied by the given theorems and ± distributes over > by
Theorem 4.2.28 and Theorem 4.2.1. 
Definition 4.8 (Semilattice [32]). A pair 〈G, ◦〉 is a semilattice if all of the following hold:
1. 〈G, ◦〉 is a commutative semigroup.
2. Idempotence: ∀a ∈ G : a ◦ a = a
Theorem 4.9 (〈R±,±, 〉 is a semilattice).
Proof :〈R±,±, 〉 satisfies Definition 4.8.
1. 〈R±,±〉 is a commutative semigroup. (Subsumed by Theorem 4.3)
2. ± is idempotent for elements of R±. (By Theorem 4.2.21)

Theorem 4.10 (〈R±,∓, 〉 is a semilattice).
Proof :〈R±,∓, 〉 satisfies Definition 4.8.
1. 〈R±,∓〉 is a commutative semigroup. (Subsumed by Theorem 4.4)
2. ∓ is idempotent for elements of R±. (By Theorem 4.2.22)

Theorem 4.11 (〈R±,>, 〉 is a semilattice).
Proof :〈R±,>, 〉 satisfies Definition 4.8.
1. 〈R±,>〉 is a commutative semigroup. (Subsumed by Theorem 4.5)
2. > is idempotent for elements of R±. (By Theorem 4.2.23)

Theorem 4.12 (〈R±,⊥, 〉 is a semilattice).
Proof :〈R±,⊥, 〉 satisfies Definition 4.8.
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1. 〈R±,>〉 is a commutative semigroup. (Subsumed by Theorem 4.6)
2. > is idempotent for elements of R±. (By Theorem 4.2.24)

Definition 4.9 (Bounded Distributive Lattice [16]). A triple 〈G,∨,∧〉 is a bounded dis-
tributive lattice if all of the following hold:
1. 〈G,∨〉 is a semilattice.
2. 〈G,∧〉 is a semilattice.
3. Absorption Law 1: ∀a, b ∈ G : a ∨ (a ∧ b) = a
4. Absorption Law 2: ∀a, b ∈ G : a ∧ (a ∨ b) = a
5. Identity for ∨: ∃0 ∈ G : ∀a ∈ G : a ∨ 0 = a
6. Identity for ∧: ∃1 ∈ G : ∀a ∈ G : a ∧ 1 = a
* The upper and lower bounds of the lattice are then 1 and 0, respectively.
7. Distributivity of ∨ over ∧: ∀a, b, c ∈ G : a ∨ (b ∧ c) = (a ∨ b) ∧ (a ∨ c).
8. Distributivity of ∧ over ∨: ∀a, b, c ∈ G : a ∧ (b ∨ c) = (a ∧ b) ∨ (a ∧ c).
Theorem 4.13 (〈R±,>,⊥, 〉 is a bounded distributive lattice).
Proof :〈R±,>,⊥, 〉 satisfies Definition 4.9.
1. 〈G,>〉 is a semilattice. (By Theorem 4.11)
2. 〈G,⊥〉 is a semilattice. (By Theorem 4.12)
3. ∀a, b ∈ G : a>(a⊥b) = a. (By Theorem 4.2.29)
4. ∀a, b ∈ G : a⊥(a>b) = a. (By Theorem 4.2.30)
5. 〈∅,Σ+〉 is an identity for >. (By Theorem 4.2.18)
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6. 〈Σ+, ∅〉 is an identity for ⊥. (By Theorem 4.2.17)
7. > distributes over ⊥. (By Theorem 4.2.31)
8. ⊥ distributes over >. (By Theorem 4.2.32)

Now that we have identified some algebraic structures formed by the signed regular
languages under various operations, we can leverage results pertaining to these structures
in order to better understand them. For example, it is shown in [40] that any monoid
〈G, ◦, eg〉 can be augmented such that ◦ operates on subsets of G as follows:
∀X,Y ⊆ G : X ◦ Y = {x ◦ y|x ∈ X, y ∈ Y }
That is, 〈P(G), ◦, {eg}〉 is also a monoid; an analogous result holds for semigroups. What
this means to us is that all four of our basic binary operations can be easily extended to
operate on collections of signed regular languages. This generalization may be useful if we
wanted combinators with a variable number of subpolicies (e.g., a list of them).
It is difficult to imagine the exact shape of the lattice 〈R±,>,⊥〉 because it is infinite.
Because this lattice is distributive, we know that the two shapes depicted in Figure 4.3,
called a pentagon and a diamond, do not appear as sub-structures anywhere in the lat-
tice [16]. Figure 4.4 demonstrates the shape of the lattice if R± was the finite set {a, b, c} to
assist in understanding its overall form. Additionally, we obtain (from [16]) two equivalent
formulations of the relation ≤ on arbitrary a, b ∈ R± that we can use to order the signed
regular languages:
a ≤ b⇔ a⊥b = a
a ≤ b⇔ a>b = b
We expected that 〈R±,±,∓〉 would form some type of interesting structure because the
union-like operations mirror each other in the venn-diagrams just as > and ⊥ do; they even
satisfy De Morgan’s laws with ¬. However, neither union-like operation distributes over the
other, so they fail to form even a ringoid—a minimal ring-like structure in which one binary
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ia
c
b
o
i
a b c
o
Figure 4.3. Pentagon and diamond shapes, which are not sub-lattices of 〈R±,>,⊥〉. The
variables a, b, c, i, and o are arbitrary signed regular languages. This figure is a re-creation
of Figure 2 in [16]
.
<{a,b,c},{}>
<{a,b},{}> <{a,c},{}> <{b,c},{}>
<{},{a,b,c}>
<{a},{}> <{b},{}><{a,b},{c}> <{c},{}><{a,c},{b}> <{b,c},{a}>
<{},{}><{a},{b}><{a},{c}> <{b},{a}><{b},{c}> <{c},{a}><{c},{b}>
<{},{a}><{},{b}><{},{c}><{a},{b,c}> <{b},{a,c}> <{c},{a,b}>
<{},{a,b}><{},{a,c}><{},{b,c}>
Figure 4.4. Lattice for 〈{a, b, c},>,⊥〉.
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operation distributes over another. An intersection operation that combines signed regular
languages 〈A+, A−〉 and 〈B+, B−〉 into 〈A+ ∩ B+, A− ∩ B−〉 would form hemirings (see
Definition 4.7) with both ± and ∓, individually, but such an operation is special purpose
and non-essential. Although 〈R±,±〉 and 〈R±,∓〉 form semilattices, 〈R±,±,∓〉 fails the
absorption laws and is not a lattice. Each of the union-like operations does form a rig with
either ⊥ or > and they are also useful for composition. Their utility is evident from their
frequency in the PoCo policies (Chapter 5).
It is satisfying that conjunction and disjunction form a bounded distributive lattice
because it is a rich structure (i.e., it has many conditions), and they embody the two
natural strategies for a security language to combinine two policies. Similarly, given that
inversion is the most common unary operation on policies, we are glad that it is involutary
and distributes over each of the binary operations (i.e., De Morgan’s laws hold). Now that
we have studied the properties of these operations, we consider their capabilities in the next
section.
4.5 The Functionally Complete Operations For Signed Regular Languages
We continue the analysis of operations on signed regular languages in this section by
considering their expressive power. That is, we would like to know whether these opera-
tions are functionally complete—sufficient for expressing all of the valid functions on the
component sets of signed regular languages. Moreover, we are interested in determining the
minimal, functionally complete operation set(s).
We can think of each signed regular language as a function f : E → {+, 0,−} and any
n-ary operation on them as a function g : {+, 0,−}n → {+, 0,−}. That is, signed regular
languages place each event into one of three categories: positive, neutral, or negative;
operations on these languages combine their categorizations to form new ones. We are now
poised to analyze signed regular operations as functions in a three-valued logic.
Some useful techniques from Boolean logic carry over if we consider these signs as truth
values, where + is true, − is false, and 0 is an intermediary value between them. Opera-
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tions can then be described by truth tables, where signed regular languages are represented
as variables over {+, 0,−}. These truth tables can be decomposed into formulas in disjunc-
tive normal form (DNF), in a manner similar to Boolean operations, using the ⊥ and >
operations along with a new = operation. That is to say, {⊥,>,=} is functionally complete.
The following truth table describes these operations in our three-valued logic:
p q p = q p>q p⊥q
− − + − −
− 0 − 0 −
− + − + −
0 − − 0 −
0 0 + 0 0
0 + − + 0
+ − − + −
+ 0 − + 0
+ + + + +
The following facts about the equality, disjunction, and conjunction operations make
them suitable for representing any truth table:
1. = has co-domain {+,−}.
2. −>x ≡ x>− ≡ x
3. +>x ≡ x>+ ≡ +.
4. −⊥x ≡ −
5. +⊥x ≡ x.
The constructions that follow rely on the constant functions f+, f0, and f− representing
the signed regular languages 〈Σ+, ∅〉, θ, and 〈∅,Σ+〉, respectively. These constants are trivial
to implement in PoCo, so their availability is assured rather than assumed. Now, we can
represent arbitrary truth tables as formulae in disjunctive normal form. For example, the
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following formula, where each disjunct is aligned with its corresponding row in the adjacent
truth table, is equivalent to p± q:
p q p± q
− − −
− 0 −
− + +
0 − −
0 0 0
0 + +
+ − +
+ 0 +
+ + +
((p = f−)⊥(q = f−)⊥f−)>
((p = f−)⊥(q = f0)⊥f−)>
((p = f−)⊥(q = f+)⊥f+)>
((p = f0)⊥(q = f−)⊥f−)>
((p = f0)⊥(q = f0)⊥f0)>
((p = f0)⊥(q = f+)⊥f+)>
((p = f+)⊥(q = f−)⊥f+)>
((p = f+)⊥(q = f0)⊥f+)>
((p = f+)⊥(q = f+)⊥f+)
The disjuncts, like the truth table, permute all possible values of p and q and test
them against constants. Therefore, exactly one of the disjuncts in the formula will satisfy
(i.e., evaluate to + on) all of the equality tests and attain the form (+⊥ + ⊥x), which is
equivalent to x. All other disjuncts will fail (i.e., evaluate to − on) at least one equality
test and evaluate to (−⊥a⊥y), (a⊥−⊥y), or (−⊥−⊥y), which is equivalent to − in any
case. The overall formula then reduces to (−>− · · ·>x> · · · − >−), which is equivalent to
x, the desired value.
The set {>,⊥,=} is functionally complete because this strategy generalizes for any n-
ary operation. The following truth table and formula demonstrate the construction in the
abstract:
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p1 p2 · · · pn f(p1, p2, . . . , pn)
− − · · · − v
− − · · · 0 w
− − · · · + x
...
...
. . .
...
...
0 0 · · · 0 y
...
...
. . .
...
...
+ + · · · + z
((p1 = f
−)⊥(p2 = f−)⊥ · · ·⊥(pn = f−)⊥v)>
((p1 = f
−)⊥(p2 = f−)⊥ · · ·⊥(pn = f0)⊥w)>
((p1 = f
−)⊥(p2 = f−)⊥ · · ·⊥(pn = f+)⊥x)>
...
((p1 = f
0)⊥(p2 = f0)⊥ · · ·⊥(pn = f0)⊥y)>
...
((p1 = f
+)⊥(p2 = f+)⊥ · · ·⊥(pn = f+)⊥z)
The question of whether our original signed regular operations are functionally complete
can now be answered. Recall that our DNF construction relies on an equality operation,
which was introduced just for that purpose. Table 4.1 depicts a truth table demonstrating
the equivalence of p = q and ((p⊥q)± ((¬p)⊥(¬q)))∓f+. Therefore, the DNF construction
can be performed using only our original operations.
Table 4.1. Truth table for p = q expressed in terms of our original signed regular operations.
p q ((p ⊥ q) ± ((¬ p) ⊥ (¬ q))) ∓ f+
− − − − − + + − + + − + +
− 0 − − 0 − + − 0 0 0 − +
− + − − + − + − − − + − +
0 − 0 − − − 0 0 0 + − − +
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 + +
0 + 0 0 + − 0 0 − − + − +
+ − + − − − − + − + − − +
+ 0 + 0 0 − − + − 0 0 − +
+ + + + + + − + − − + + +
Now that it has been established that {∓,±,>,⊥,¬} is a functionally complete set of
operations, we are in a position to consider a minimal set from which each of them can
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be constructed. In fact, there is a functionally complete singleton (often called a “Sheffer
function” due to [37]) {?}, where ? is defined by the following truth table:
p q p ? q
− − +
− 0 0
− + −
0 − −
0 0 +
0 + 0
+ − −
+ 0 0
+ + +
Before the ? constructions for conjunction, disjunction, and equality are presented,
notice that we only need them to be equivalent in the cases that occur in the DNF formulae.
That is, the equivalence for ⊥ doesn’t need to hold when the left operand is 0 because its left-
hand side in such a formula is always the outcome of an equality test. Similarly, one of >’s
operands will certainly be −, so other permutations aren’t necessary to consider. Ignoring
these impossible permutations reduces the complexity of the equivalent constructions.
The following equivalences hold for =, ⊥, and > as they are used in the DNF formulae
(Tables 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 depict their respective truth tables):
1. p = q ≡ (p ? q) ? (f− ? ((f− ? (p ? q)) ? (p ? q)
2. p⊥q ≡ (p ? ((f− ? (f0 ? (f− ? p))) ? (q ? p))) ? p
3. p>q ≡ f− ? ((f− ? p) ? (f− ? q))
We now know that we could implement all operations with just ?. This fact gives us
some peace of mind in that we don’t have to worry about useful combinators that were
overlooked in the design process. Additionally, an implementation of PoCo could provide
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Table 4.2. Truth table for p = q expressed in terms of ?.
p q (p ? q) ? (f− ? ((f− ? (p ? q)) ? (p ? q)))
− − − + − + − + − − − + − − − + −
− 0 − 0 0 − − − − 0 − 0 0 + − 0 0
− + − − + − − + − + − − + − − − +
0 − 0 − − − − + − + 0 − − − 0 − −
0 0 0 + 0 + − + − − 0 + 0 − 0 + 0
0 + 0 0 + − − − − 0 0 0 + + 0 0 +
+ − + − − − − + − + + − − − + − −
+ 0 + 0 0 − − − − 0 + 0 0 + + 0 0
+ + + + + + − + − − + + + − + + +
Table 4.3. Truth table for p⊥q expressed in terms of ?.
p q (p ? ((f− ? (f0 ? (f− ? p))) ? (q ? p))) ? p
− − − 0 − 0 0 0 − + − 0 − + − − −
− 0 − + − 0 0 0 − + − − 0 − − − −
− + − + − 0 0 0 − + − − + − − − −
+ − + − − + 0 − − − + − − − + − +
+ 0 + 0 − + 0 − − − + 0 0 0 + 0 +
+ + + + − + 0 − − − + + + + + + +
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Table 4.4. Truth table for p>q expressed in terms of ?.
p q f− ? ((f− ? p) ? (f− ? q))
− − − − − + − + − + −
− 0 − 0 − + − 0 − 0 0
− + − + − + − − − − +
0 − − 0 − 0 0 0 − + −
+ − − + − − + − − + −
just one combinator without losing any expressiveness. While this is not something to be
recommended, as many compositions would become unwieldy, it is still an advantage over
other systems. For example, although Polymer provides several general-purpose combi-
nators, we introduced a Not combinator in Section 3.3 to make up for the lack of unary
inversion (in order to avoid writing two versions of the OpenWithExt policy).
Now that sufficient background has been established and our policy outputs have been
thoroughly examined, we are ready to put them to use in actual policies. The next chapter
defines and explains the PoCo language and demonstrates its features through example
policies.
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CHAPTER 5
THE POCO LANGUAGE WITH EXAMPLES
This chapter introduces the PoCo language by specifying its syntax and providing exam-
ples that demonstrate how its features operate. We begin with an overview of the language,
which provides necessary background and walks the reader through the construction of some
policies and combinators. The overview demonstrates the use of many of PoCo’s features
and explains how they operate. Afterward, the full syntax is defined, which includes fea-
tures that do not appear in the overview. In order to demonstrate its expressive power, we
translate a sophisticated policy that constrains the behavior of an email client (from [3])
from Polymer into PoCo.
5.1 Overview of PoCo
Before introducing PoCo’s complete syntax, we first discuss the basics of specifying
policies in the language. Most of the syntax can be extrapolated from a few examples. We
start with a very simple policy to cover the bare essentials of how policies are specified and
enforced. Afterward, we relax this policy, which increases its complexity and introduces
some new features. We then move on to the specification and application of some example
combinators.
PoCo is defined in this dissertation with object-oriented, Java-like applications in mind
because Polymer’s implementation constrains Java programs. Continuing in the same tra-
dition allows the most direct comparison between the languages. Additionally, AspectJ is
appropriate for implementing PoCo, so it is reasonable to proceed accordingly. Therefore,
actions have the form of method invocations, and results have the form of objects (which
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may be wrappers for primitive values). The specification does not depend on object ori-
entation and could have been presented in terms of another paradigm (e.g., a functional
language), but doing so would obscure PoCo’s relationship to Polymer.
Recall that an MRA execution is represented as a sequence of exchanges, each consisting
of an input and output event. PoCo policies are best thought of as patterns that describe all
satisfactory executions. Policies are expressed using abstract exchanges, each of which is a
pair containing a regular language and a signed regular language (in that order). Regular
expressions are denoted by ` . . . `, and they are signed by a preceding + or −. Signed regular
expressions can be combined using the signed regular operations introduced in Section 4.3.
Abstract exchanges can be sequenced (specified one after the another), switched on (using |),
repeated zero or more (including infinitely-many) times (using superscript∞), and grouped
(using [ and ]). Each of these constructions is later demonstrated with concrete examples.
The first element in each abstract exchange is a regular expression on the input event
and the previous output event, which may be complemented by preceding it with ∼. Strings
of the form a ⇒ r denote that the input r is the result of executing the previously output
action a, and those of the form a ⇐ r denote that the input action a was received in
response to result r being output. This information allows each policy to determine the
actual execution that is occurring, which, due to how it is composed with others, may differ
from that which it is attempting to build.
The abstract exchanges can include “bindings” of variable names to regular expressions
in order to store information from events in memory. These bindings have the following
form:
@name[regular expresson].
The values that these variables are bound to can be inserted into (signed) regular expres-
sions using $name. This allows policies to express relationships between various points in
executions. Binding and inserting values does not violate the regularity of the languages
because insertions happen before the match is attempted and binding occurs only after a
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match succeeds. This is in contrast to the “regex” facilities of many modern programming
languages that support “back-matching”, which is a non-regular behavior.
The policy output, along with its relationship to the input event, indicates how an
MRA should operate in order to enforce the policy. Informally, the algorithm for choosing
an output event has seven steps:
1. If there is an easy-to-find action that is good, output it.
2. If the input event is good, output it.
3. If there is an easy-to-find result that is good, output it.
4. If the input event is neutral, output it.
5. If there is an easy-to-find result that is neutral, output it.
6. If there is an easy-to-find action that is neutral, output it.
7. Terminate the execution.
The term “easy-to-find” in the above algorithm means that the event is a member of a
finite set in the output. Because a signed regular language can have infinite-many positive
members and non-members (negative members are never output), it may be the case that
we have infinitely-many events to choose from when selecting one to output. We avoid
outputting arbitrary members of infinite sets in all cases because they are too liberally
defined for each member to be considered a reasonable choice.
We now specify the output-selection algorithm more precisely. Recall that A denotes
the set of all actions, R denotes the set of all results, and E = A ∪ R. Suppose a policy
outputs the signed regular language 〈B+, B−〉 in response to the input event ein. Then the
monitor proceeds considering each of the following cases in order:
1. Case (B+ ∩ A) non-empty and finite: Output some action a ∈ ((B+ ∩ A)r {ein}).
Priority is given to actions that the policy proposes, so long as it proposes finitely
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many, because policies are essentially deferring their decision on the input action
while they output actions of their own and receive results for them.
2. Case ein ∈ B+: Output ein. The input is preferred by the policy and there is no
finite set of proposed alternative actions. Even if ein is a result and some results are
in B+, we prefer ein because only one result can be given back to the application
for its action and ein was proposed by both the system and the policy.
3. Case (B+ ∩R) non-empty and finite: Output some result r ∈ (B+ ∩R). When the
policy wants to output a result, it is done performing any actions. Any positively
signed result is suitable at this point.
4. Case ein 6∈ B−: Output ein. There is no obvious preferred event to output, so
default to the input because it is neutral.
5. Case ((B+ ∪B−) ∩R) non-empty and finite: Output some result r 6∈± B. A finite,
non-empty set of neutral events will only exist if some particular events were left
out of a signed regular expression. Because they are explicitly not signed, they can
be anticipated, and are therefore reasonable to output. Neutral results are preferred
over neutral actions because there is more incentive to get another action from the
target than there is to extend the execution with irrelevant actions.
6. Case ((B+ ∪B−)∩A) non-empty and finite: Output some action a 6∈± B. Because
all other outputs have been ruled out by this stage, neutral actions are the only
valid outputs to choose from.
7. Otherwise: Output nothing. There is no acceptable course of action, so the monitor
must refrain from outputting any event. This effectively terminates an MRA exe-
cution because no further events will be input or output. In practice, the monitor
could output some abortive action, if one exists.
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We have now established the high-level structure of policies and the details of how
policy outputs are interpreted by an MRA. We proceed to study concrete policy examples
to illustrate how they operate and demonstrate some of PoCo’s syntax.
5.1.1 Example Base Policies
A simple class of PoCo policies prohibit certain events from ever being output from the
monitor; these can be specified using a single abstract exchange. For example, suppose
we wanted to prevent a program from reading the disk as a precaution against searches
for sensitive information. Say this occurs by calling the read() method of a File object.
Then the event of interest would be an action matching the pattern `{%} : File→ read()`,
where:
1. Virtual method calls have the form o → m, where m is the method being invoked
on some object o.
2. Objects have the form {. . . } : τ , where { and } delimit a sequence of field-value
associations and τ is some object type.
3. Methods have the form x(o1, . . . , on), where x is its name and each oi is an argument
object.
4. The symbol % is the multi-character wildcard, which matches any (possibly empty)
sequence of symbols.
Therefore, the above pattern matches an invocation of read() on any instance of File,
irrespective of the object’s field values.
We can specify the policy that prevents the target from reading files as follows:
NoFileReads() : (∼ `{%} : File→ read()`, θ)∞
This policy is introduced with the name NoFileReads and has no parameters. It matches
input events against the pattern ∼ `{%} : File→ read()`, which successfully matches any
input except an invocation of read() on a File. Upon matching an input, the policy
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outputs θ, indicating indifference toward the input. This behavior is repeated as long as
more inputs arrive, perhaps infinitely many times. If a file-reading action was input, then
the match would fail and the poilcy would cease to output anything; the execution would
not progress further.
This policy is likely to be overly restrictive given that there are many legitimate reasons
for a program to read a file. The application may read some configuration files upon starting.
If so, NoFileReads will prohibit this and prevent the program form progressing any further.
We can write a more accommodating version called LimitFileReads that is parameterized
by an integer denoting the maximum number of File→read() calls that are permitted.
The overall logic of LimitFileReads is illustrated in Figure 5.1. It starts by “waiting”
for the application to input File→read(), meaning that it outputs θ while other events are
input. When File→read() is input, the policy determines whether any more file-reading
calls are permitted. If so, the file-reading action is output, the number of permitted calls
is decremented, and the policy repeats from the beginning; otherwise, the policy fails to
match and the execution ceases.
The repetition that occurs whenever the policy wants a certain action to be executed
is to cooperate with other policies whose proposed alternative events may get output first.
The policy attempts to deliver the result of File→read() to the application as long as
the monitor is outputting actions to the system. That is, when this policy has finished
interjecting its bookkeeping sequence after the file is read, other policies may continue to
execute actions.
Now that we have designed the policy logic, we move on to implementing it. The
realization of LimitFileReads introduces several new features. The policy is first presented
and then explained in detail. We specify this policy, with line numbers for later reference,
as follows:
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Is the input a file-reading action?
Bind call to the input action
Yes
Output θ
No
max > 0?
Terminate
No
Promote call to read the file
Yes
Didn't execute
Was the file read?
No
Bind res to the result
Yes
Compute max-1
Was max-1 executed?
Re-bind max to the result
Yes
No
Promote res
Input is a result?
Yes
No
Figure 5.1. An illustration of the logic of the LimitFileReads policy.
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LimitF ileReads(Integer max) :
1 [ (`@call[{%} : File→ read()⇐ %]`,+ + `gt($max, {0} : Integer)`)
2 (`gt($max, {0} : Integer)⇒ {true} : Boolean`,+ + `$call`)
3 (`$call⇒ @res[%]`,+ + `sub($max, {1} : Integer)`)
4 (`sub($max, {1} : Integer)⇒ @max[%]`,+`$res`)
5 (`%⇒ %`,+`$res`)∞
6 | (`%`, θ) ]∞
The policy code contains the syntactic construct ++, which has not yet been discussed.
Whereas +`...` denotes a positive, signed regular language, + + `...` further indicates
that the action therein is required before moving on in the policy. This feature is merely
“syntactic sugar”: it is not strictly necessary. In fact, (` . . . `,+ + `a`) is merely shorthand
for (` . . . `,+`a`)(∼`a ⇒ %`,+`a`)∞. That is, the required action a is output, and it is
continually proposed until its result is input (i.e., it was executed). When a is executed,
the pattern ∼ `a⇒ %` will fail to match its result because it is the complement of exactly
that. The policy will stop trying to repeat the (∼`a⇒ %`,+`a`) abstract exchange when
the result arrives, and will move on to attempt matching it against the next part of the
policy.
Because the only operators that can appear within abstract exchanges are for combining
signed regular languages, PoCo lacks expressions for performing general computations and
comparing or modifying the values of variables. Computations are performed by outputting
the appropriate actions, and variable are updated when identifiers are bound to new values.
LimitFileReads uses the gt and sub actions to perform greater-than testing and subtrac-
tion, respectively. Although this restriction makes policy specification less convenient, it
makes even policy-state computations composable.
We now examine each line of the policy in greater detail, line by line:
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1. If the input event is an invocation of a File object’s read() method, then bind it
to call, promote the action that tests whether max is greater than zero repeatedly
until it executes, and go to Line 2; otherwise, go to Line 6.
2. If the greater-than test (which was required on Line 1 and must have executed by
now) returns true (e.g., max > 0), then promote call (the input action from Line 1)
repeatedly until it executes and go to Line 3; otherwise, the match fails because the
inequality test returned false. The matching behavior falls through as follows:
(a) The pattern `greater($max, {0} : Integer) ⇒ {true} : Boolean` doesn’t
match the input when the result is {false} : Boolean.
(b) This abstract exchange is not part of a switch. Although Line 1 and Line 6
form a switch, matching on the beginning of the sequence already succeeded
on Line 1 at this point, so there are no further cases to consider if matching
fails on Line 2.
(c) This abstract exchange is part of a repeated sequence (Lines 1-6). When a
repeated sequence fails to match an input, the matching attempt continues
on whatever follows that sequence. In this case, nothing follows the repeated
sequence in which the match failure occurred, so execution ceases.
3. We know that call executed if we’ve reached this point because Line 2 repeatedly
promotes it in all other cases. Bind the result of call to res so we can output it
later, promote computing max− 1 repeatedly until it executes, and go to Line 4.
4. It must be that max− 1 was computed at this point, so re-bind max to the result.
We are done with our bookkeeping routine now and can give the application the
result for the read() invocation that occurred earlier when call executed. Promote
res and go to Line 5.
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5. While actions are being executed (output by other policies), continue to promote
res. Go to Line 1 when an action is input (the monitor output a result to the
application).
6. The input didn’t match File→read() on Line 1, so we catch all other possibilities
here and output θ because we are only concerned with file reading. Go back to
Line 1.
If LimitFileReads was concerned with not only the target, but other policies reading
files, it would need to prohibit read() when outputting each of its bookkeeping actions,
and decrement max whenever read() is executed due to other policies. The way the policy
is currently specified, it neither negatively signs read() in its outputs nor checks whether
an input is the result of a read() action. Even when $call is promoted, all other file
reads would need to be prohibited (the ± operation is useful for making such exceptions).
This is because policies do not respond to each other’s outputs, but express themselves
fully upfront, letting combinators control how those outputs are composed. Therefore, a
prohibition-preserving operation like ∓ or ⊥ could be used to combine LimitFileReads
with another policy in order to control whether that policy, as well as the target, may read
files.
This prohibition is not necessary when constraining the application only, because a
positively-signed, finite set of output actions takes precedence over any policy input, as
previously discussed. That is, when a read() action is input on Line 1, the positively-
signed gt action will be output by the monitor. If the read() turns out to be permissible
after max is checked, then the policy has to propose it because the current input event at
that point will be the result of gt. No result will be output to the application while the
policy outputs positively-signed actions.
5.1.2 Example Combinators
Combinators are defined similarly to policies, but at least one of their parameters is a
policy. In addition to matching on the input event, a combinator also matches against the
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signed regular outputs of its subpolicies. As a result, the abstract exchanges in combinators
are triples, rather than pairs, containing a tuple of subpolicy constraints in between the
usual regular input and signed regular output. The subpolicy identifiers can be used as
signed regular languages within the triple, where they represent the subpolicy outputs on
the current input event. There are three ways to specify a constraint on a subpolicy output:
1. Assignment (e.g., x← s): Binds an identifier x to a signed regular language s. This
constraint is always satisfied, and the bindings last until they are overwritten.
2. Signed membership (e.g., r ∈+ s): The membership of regular language r, with
respect to the positive, negative, and neutral components of signed regular language
s, can be tested. Our use of the term “membership” here is rather liberal because r
may contain any number of events. Therefore, we are checking whether r is a subset
of the given component.
3. Signed regular equality (e.g., x = +` . . . ` ± −` . . . `): The policy output can be
compared in terms of equality (including 6=) against another signed regular language.
Alternatively, a wildcard (written ), which is trivially satisfied, may be given in place of
the constraint tuple.
For example, consider a combinator called PreferOKInputAct with a single subpolicy
that prefers the input action instead of its subpolicy’s output whenever the input is not
prohibited by the subpolicy (i.e., it is “OK”). When the input is a result or is prohibited
by the subpolicy, it outputs whatever the subpolicy does. This combinator has three cases
to consider:
1. The input is an action, and it is negatively signed in the subpolicy output.
2. The input is an action, and it is not negatively signed in the subpolicy output (i.e.,
it is positive or neutral).
3. The input is a result.
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We are now ready to specify this combinator. We can avoid grouping the entire policy
in order to repeat its behavior by indicating repetition after the policy parameters (e.g.,
name(parameter, . . . , parameter)∞ : . . . ). The final case in the combinator doesn’t have
to actually specify that the input is a result because the first two cases handle all possible
actions. Because the cases are considered in order when matching, the pattern `%` is
sufficient there. We can specify this combinator as follows:
PreferOKInputAct(Policy p)∞ :
(`@in[%]⇐ %`, (`$in` ∈− p), p)
| (`@in[%]⇐ %`, ,+`$in`)
| (`%`, , p)
Combinators output a signed regular language just as policies do. The five standard
signed regular operations have natural combinator analogues. For example, we can define
a conjunctive combinator as follows:
Conj(Policy p1, Policy p2)∞ : (`%`, , p1⊥p2)
This Conj combinator takes two policy parameters and no others. On any input event,
it outputs p1⊥p2, which is the conjunction of its subpolicies’ outputs on that input. Exam-
ples of more sophisticated combinators will appear when we implement superpolicies from
Polymer’s Email policy using PoCo.
Policies may also be composed by the literal abstract exchanges that make them up.
That is, combinators may treat policies as data in order to form new policies. The declar-
ative style of PoCo policy definitions makes them well-suited for this type of combination.
Because abstract exchanges can be switched, concatenated, and repeated, it is natural to
define combinators that combine entire policies in each of these ways. The concatenation
combinator, for example, simply follows the first policy body with the second. Being able
to combine policies literally allows us to express some complex policies as combinations of
single-exchange policies. The three main literal combinators are straightforward:
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Switch(Policy p1, Policy p2) : [ p1 | p2 ]
Cat(Policy p1, Policy p2) : p1 p2
Rep(Policy p) : [p]∞
The usefulness of literal combination can be demonstrated using our LimitFileReads
policy. Encoding the read() limit via the max variable led to more complication than the
policy warrants. We can instead write a new policy that permits at most one invocation of
read() and concatenate it with itself to express the number of invocations that are allowed
as follows:
OneFileRead() :
(∼ `{%} : File→read()⇐ %`, θ)∞(`%`, θ)(∼ `{%} : File→read()⇐ %`, θ)∞
Now, we can compose OneFileRead with itself to limit the application to k ∈ N file-reading
operations. For example, the application can be limited to reading three files with the
following composition:
Cat(OneFileRead(), Cat(OneFileRead(), OneF ileRead()))
The above composition expands to a sequence of abstract exchanges:
(∼ `{%} : File→read()⇐ %`, θ)∞(`%`, θ)(∼ `{%} : File→read()⇐ %`, θ)∞
(∼ `{%} : File→read()⇐ %`, θ)∞(`%`, θ)(∼ `{%} : File→read()⇐ %`, θ)∞
(∼ `{%} : File→read()⇐ %`, θ)∞(`%`, θ)(∼ `{%} : File→read()⇐ %`, θ)∞
Finally, we can use an exponent to indicate several instances of a policy concatenated
together:
LimitF ileReads(Integer max) : OneFileRead()max
Now that some PoCo policies and combinators have been demonstrated, we proceed to
detail the entirety of the language’s features in the next section. Although most of the
important features of the language have been appeared in the previous examples, a more
general treatment than some instances of use is necessary.
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5.2 Syntax Definition
The syntax of PoCo is now presented as a context-free grammar with commentary
beside or below the productions. These comments indicate the purpose or meaning of the
nonterminals and their rules.
ESC ::= `[]?@ %$
Escape characters have special meaning
SYM ::= ESC
Non-escape characters are symbols
| \ESC
Escape characters are symbols when preceded by a backslash
ID ::= [a− zA− Z][a− zA− Z0− 9]∗
Identifiers
QID ::= ID | QID.ID
Qualified identifiers
FIELDLIST ::= ID : R
Used to express object fields as comma separated list
|FIELDLIST, ID : R
OBJECT ::= {QID} : QID
Objects can refer to a static field by its qualified identifier
| {R} : TY P
Objects that are wrappers for simple data have no fields
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| {FIELDLIST} : QID
General objects are specified by their field values and a class name
| null
The null object is specified plainly
| ID
An object variable
| {0 : OBJECT, 1 : OBJECT, . . . , n : OBJECT} : Array
Arrays are objects whose fields are sequential natural numbers
TY P ::= Byte | Short | Integer | Long | Float
| Double | Boolean | Char | String
The object types without fields
R REs that are used both in input REs and in signed REs
::= SYM a single literal or escaped symbol
| RR Concatenation
| [R] Grouping
| R|R Switching
| R∗ Repetition 0 or more times
| R+ Repetition 1 or more times
| ∼ R Complementation
| R? Optional (i.e., 0 or 1 occurrences of R)
| % Multi-character wildcard, equivalent to SYM∗
| $ID Gets replaced with bound variable
| @ID[R] Binds variable
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IRE REs used to match against input events
::= `R⇐R`
Matches an action caused by a result
| `R⇒R`
Matches a result caused by an action
| `R⇔R
Matches an input action or result
| ∼ `R⇐R`
Matches everything except an action caused by result
| ∼ `R⇔R`
Matches everything except an input action or result
SREBOP Binary operations for SREs
::= ± Optimistic Union
| ∓ Pessimistic Union
| > Disjunction
| ⊥ Conjunction
SREUOP ::= ∼Unary negation operation for SREs
SRE Signed REs
::= θ
The SRE where everything is in the neutral set
| + `R`
Positive RE
| − `R`
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Negative RE
| [SRE]
Grouping of SREs
| ID
An identifier bound to an SRE
| SRE SREBOP SRE
Apply binary operation on SREs
| SREUOP SRE
Apply unary operation on SREs
| + +`R`
Positively signs R in output and follows the abstract exchange
in which it occurs with (∼ `R⇒ %`,+`R`)∞.
STATEBINDING ::= @ID[R]Used for binding variables outside of REs
BEXCH Exchanges for base policies
::= (IRE, SRE)
Standard exchange
| WaitForAction R
Equivalent to (∼ `R⇐ %`,−`R`)∞.
| WaitForResult R
Equivalent to (∼ `R⇒ %`, θ)∞.
| STATEBINDING
Statebinding at any point, but not counted as an exchange
| PINST
A policy applied to arguments is an execution e.g., OneFileRead()
81
PINST The instantiation of a policy
::= ID()
A policy defined without parameters
| ID(ARGS)
A policy defined with some parameters
ARGS An argument list
::= OBJECT
A single argument
| ARGS,OBJECT
A list of arguments, plus one more
BEXECUTION Base policy execution
::= BEXCH
Base list of exchanges
| BEXECUTION BEXECUTION
Concatenation
| [BEXECUTION ]
Grouping
| BEXECUTION | BEXECUTION
Switching
| BEXECUTION∞
Repeat 0 or more times
| BEXECUTIONOBJECT
An exact number of repetitions
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|
+⋃
SRE
[BEXECUTION ]
Adds ± SRE to every result in BEXECUTION
|
−⋃
SRE
[BEXECUTION ]
Adds ∓ SRE to every result in BEXECUTION
SPCOND A condition on subpolicy outputs
::= ID → SRE
Bind ID to a signed regular language (always succeeds)
| R ELEM SRE
Test whether R is a subset of a component of ID
| SRE = SRE
| SRE 6= SRE
Signed regular equality tests for subpolicy output
| |SRE| =∞
| |SRE| 6=∞
Test whether a signed regular language has an infinite component
SPCONDS List of conditions on subpolicy outputs
::= SPCOND
A single condition
| SPCONDS, SPCOND
A list of conditions, plus an additional one
ELEM Binary signed membership (⊆) test
::= R ∈+ ID | R 6∈+ ID | R ∈− ID | R 6∈− ID | R ∈± ID | R 6∈± ID
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CXCH The contents of a combinator definition
::= (IRE, , SRE)
Combinator exchanges without subpolicy conditions
| (IRE, (SPCONDS), SRE)
Combinator exchanges with subpolicy conditions
| STATEBINDING
Statebinding at any point, but not counted as an exchange
| ID
A policy variable (e.g., in the Cat combinator)
CEXECUTION Combinator Execution
::= CEXCH
Exchange/statebinding
| CEXECUTION CEXECUTION
Concatenation
| [CEXECUTION ]
grouping
| CEXECUTION | CEXECUTION
Switching
| CEXECUTION∞
0 or more repetitions
| CEXECUTIONOBJECT
An exact number of repetitions
|
+⋃
SRE
[CEXECUTION ]
Adds ± SRE to every result in CEXECUTION
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|
−⋃
SRE
[CEXECUTION ]
Adds ∓ SRE to every result in CEXECUTION
PARAMLIST List of parameters for parameterized policies
::= QID ID
| PARAMLIST,QID ID
PPOL Complete PoCo policy without auxiliary methods
::= ID(PARAMLIST )∞ : CEXECUTION
Repeating combinator policy with parameters
| ID(PARAMLIST )∞ : BEXECUTION
Repeating base policy with parameters
| ID(PARAMLIST ) : CEXECUTION
Non-repeating combinator policy with parameters
| ID(PARAMLIST ) : BEXECUTION
Non-repeating base policy with parameters
| ID()∞ : CEXECUTION
Repeating combinator policy with no parameters
| ID()∞ : BEXECUTION
Repeating base policy with no parameters
| ID() : CEXECUTION
Non-repeating combinator policy with no parameters
| ID() : BEXECUTION
Non-repeating base policy with no parameters
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POLICY A complete policy declaration
::= PPOL
A policy with no auxiliary methods
| PPOL METHODS
A policy with auxiliary methods
METHOD An auxiliary method declaration
::= ∵METHOD DECL
A Java method declaration (Java’s grammar not reproduce here)
METHODS A sequence of auxiliary method declarations
::= METHOD
| METHODS METHOD
Now that PoCo’s syntax has been fully introduced, we proceed to apply its constructs
in the next section to implement a complex policy. The ability to define auxiliary methods
along with PoCo policies allows tedious computations to be consolidated into a single action.
This is used in the case study to emulate Polymer’s handleResult method, in which policies
can specify an arbitrary algorithm to execute whenever their suggestion is followed.
5.3 Case Study: Polymer’s Email Policy
This section establishes that PoCo is an expressive language by implementing the sophis-
ticated security policy for an email client that was originally written using Polymer [3, 4].
We first implement the base policies, which are self-contained modules that address par-
ticular security concerns. We then implement each of the super policies, which combine
or augment the behavior of one or more policies. Some of the policy figures require line
wrapping to overcome the limited width of this dissertation’s format. Every line that is a
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continuation of the previous one begins with a ↪→. Wrapped lines are also indented at least
two levels deeper than the original line to further distinguish wrapping from nesting.
5.3.1 Base Policies
We start this case study by implementing each of the base policies, which detail how the
monitor should respond to specific security-relevant events. Each of these policies highlights
a certain facet of email-client behavior that is a potential source of danger. Many of these
potentially dangerous behaviors are not particular to email clients, so several of these policies
are relevant to a variety of applications.
We begin with the simplest policies, which only involve a single abstract exchange. Fig-
ure 5.2 shows the PoCo versions of the Trivial, DisSysCalls, Reflection, and NoOpen-
ClassFiles policies, collectively. The Trivial policy outputs θ for any input, so it has no
effect on executions. Even so, it is useful as a subpolicy for combinators that select which
of its subpolicies’ responses to output, effectively toggling the enforcement of a subpolicy
on and off.
Trivial()∞ : (`%`, θ)
DisSysCalls()∞ : (`%`,−`Runtime.exec(%)`)
Reflection()∞ : (`%`,−`{Name : %PoCo%} : Method→invoke(%)`)
NoOpenClassF iles()∞ : (`%`,−`File.init({%.class} : String)`)
Figure 5.2. Implementation of some simple Polymer base policies in PoCo.
Each of the remaining policies mentioned above is part of the policy branch that prevents
the application from circumventing the security monitor, which should be a part of every
policy tree. DisSysCalls prevents applications from using Runtime.exec to execute arbi-
trary strings, which could be used to wrap and disguise dangerous actions. The Reflection
policy prevents the application from invoking Method objects (which are obtained using re-
flection) that belong to the policy-enforcement mechanism. This is done by prohibiting the
invocation of Methods whose fully qualified name is prefixed by the package name belonging
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to the mechanism code. Because our mechanism is not yet implemented, we will simply
prohibit the invocations of Methods whose name contains “PoCo”. Finally, NoOpenClass-
Files prevents the application from accessing compiled code that could be executed by the
Java runtime. This is done by prohibiting File objects from being instantiated (via the
special init method) on paths ending in “.class”.
The AllowOnlyMIME policy, shown in Figure 5.3, restricts the ports that a network socket
can be opened on. Because the application is an email client, it should only communicate
over the network on ports that are associated with email protocols. The IMAP, SMTP, and
POP3 protocols use ports 143, 25, and 110, respectively. IMAP and POP3 transmissions
can be secured using SSL, in which case IMAP uses port 993 and POP3 uses port 995.
Because sockets can be opened in a multitude of ways, Polymer uses an abstract action
called NetworkOpens that matches all such actions. PoCo, as it is currently defined, lacks
an analogue of abstract actions, but is able to enumerate all relevant actions in a single
regular expression.
Figure 5.4 contains the Attachments policy, which intercepts actions that would create
a file having a forbidden extension. For the email client, this could happen if the user down-
AllowOnlyMIME()∞ :
@ports[`{∼ [143|993|25|110|995]} : Integer`]
(`%`,−`[{%} : mail.[imap.IMAPStore|pop3.POP3Store|smtp.SMTPTransport]→
↪→ protocolConnect(%, $ports%)
↪→ |java.net.Socket.init(%, $ports%)
↪→ |{%} : DatagramSocket→send({port : $ports} : DatagramPacket)
↪→ |{port : $ports} : java.net.MulticastSocket→[leave|join]Group(%)
↪→ |{%} : java.net.MulticastSocket→
↪→ send({port : $ports} : DatagramPacket,%)]`)
Figure 5.3. PoCo version of Polymer’s AllowOnlyMIME policy.
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loads an attachment. The WaitForAction `$fileWrite` line outputs θ and repeats until
the input is an action matching the fileWrite pattern. The policy issues a warning via
a popup window, where the user can choose to allow or cancel the download. This policy
uses “statebinding” to bind ext to a regular expression matching all of the forbidden file
extensions before the first abstract exchange. This allows us to conveniently maintain the
forbidden extensions in one place for the whole policy. The
⋃+
−`$fileWrite`[. . . ] construct
allows us to prohibit all file-writing actions in each abstract exchange within the brackets,
except when we positively sign such an action (e.g., when +`$call` is output). This is be-
cause
⋃+ uses the ± operator to combine each output with the prohibited events. This also
means that the θ output of the last abstract exchange in the policy is really −`$fileWrite`.
The ConfirmAndAllowOnlyHTTP policy, as displayed in Figure 5.5, alerts the user when-
ever the target attempts to establish an HTTP network connection, and prevents other
types of network connections. This policy is essentially a cross between AllowOnlyMIME
and Attachments.
The purpose of the ClassLoaders policy is to prevent the target from loading arbitrary
classes at runtime. The policy intercepts instantiations of ClassLoader objects in order to
inspect the call stack and determine whether a trusted component is loading the class or
not. If so, then it is allowed; otherwise, it is prohibited. This policy makes use of arrays: the
call stack obtained from an exception is one. Whereas Polymer iterates through this array,
checking the prefix of each entry against each trusted package name, PoCo can express a
pattern that matches when any array element has such a prefix. When the target attempts
to load a class, we output −`%`, which prohibits all events, to emulate Polymer’s HaltSug
output. This policy’s specification appears in Figure 5.6.
InterruptToCheckMem instantiates an interrupt-generating object, then matches against
the interrupts it generates in order to regularly check what percentage of memory is being
used. Because this policy wants to run the interrupt generator as soon as possible, it
promotes doing so in lieu of the first input action. After the generator is running, the
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policy then requires the execution of the initial action. After that, it outputs θ on all inputs
until an interrupt is input. If memory usage is within tolerance, θ is repeatedly output.
If memory usage exceeds the given limit, then a popup window displays a warning, and it
continues outputting θ for all future inputs. That is, the popup window appears only once:
Attachments()∞ :
@ext[`.[exe|vbs|hta|mdb|bad]`]
@fileWrite[`{name : {%$ext} : String} : File→createNewFile()
↪→ |File.createTempFile({%} : String, {%$ext} : String,%)
↪→ |{%} : File→renameTo({name : {%$ext} : String} : File→)
↪→ |FileOutputStream.init({%$ext} : String,%)
↪→ |FileOutputStream.init({name : {%$ext} : String} : File)
↪→ |RandomAccessF ile.init({%$ext} : String,%)
↪→ |RandomAccessF ile.init({name : {%$ext} : String} : File,%)`]
WaitForAction `$fileWrite`⋃+
−`$fileWrite`
[
(`@call[$fileWrite]⇐%`,+`@confirm[showConfirmDialog(null,
↪→ {The target is creating a file via:$call. This is a
↪→ dangerous file type. Do you want to create this file?} : String,
↪→ {Security Question} : String,
↪→ {JOptionPane.Y ES NO OPTION} : Integer)]`)
[ (`$confirm⇒{JOptionPane.OK OPTION} : Integer`,+`$call`)
| (`%`, θ) ]
]
Figure 5.4. PoCo version of Polymer’s Attachments policy.
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when memory usage is first observed to be over the limit. Observe that the target is not
terminated for using excessive memory. This policy is specified in Figure 5.7.
The IncomingMail policy, shown in Figure 5.8, augments the email client’s handling of
received emails by doing each of the following:
ConfirmAndAllowOnlyHTTP ()∞ :
@ports[`{[80|443]} : Integer`]
@netCon[`{%} : mail.[imap.IMAPStore|pop3.POP3Store|smtp.SMTPTransport]→
↪→ protocolConnect(%, $ports%)
↪→ |java.net.Socket.init(%, $ports%)
↪→ |{%} : DatagramSocket→send({port : $ports} : DatagramPacket)
↪→ |{port : $ports} : java.net.MulticastSocket→[leave|join]Group(%)
↪→ |{%} : java.net.MulticastSocket→
↪→ send({port : $ports} : DatagramPacket,%)`]
WaitForAction `$netCon`⋃+
−`$netCon`
[
(`@call[$netCon]⇐%`,+`@confirm[showConfirmDialog(null,
↪→ {The program is attempting to make an HTTP connection
↪→ via:$call. Do you want to allow this connection?} : String,
↪→ {Security Question} : String,
↪→ {JOptionPane.Y ES NO OPTION} : Integer)]`)
[ (`$confirm⇒{JOptionPane.OK OPTION} : Integer`,+`$call`)
| (`%`, θ) ]
]
Figure 5.5. PoCo version of Polymer’s ConfirmAndAllowOnlyHTTP policy.
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1. Checks each message sender’s address against a file of trusted addresses, and marks
messages from untrusted addresses by prepending “SPAM? - ” to the subject line.
2. Imposes a limit on the length of the subject line.
3. Issues a warning when new emails from untrusted addresses contain attachments.
4. Logs all messages in a local file.
Items 1-3 above are handled by the spamifySubject action, and Item 4 is performed by
the log action.
The OutgoingMail policy is specified in Figure 5.9. When an email is to be sent out,
this policy does the following:
1. Logs the outgoing message.
2. Pops up a confirmation window listing the email’s recipients.
3. Blind copies (BCCs) the mail to a given address for backup purposes.
ClassLoaders()∞ :
WaitForAction `ClassLoader.init(%)`⋃+
−`ClassLoader.init(%)`
[
(@call[`ClassLoader.init(%)]⇐%`,+ + `Exception.init()`)
(`Exception.init()⇒@ex{%}`,+ + `{$ex} : Exception→getStackTrace()`)
]
[ (`{$ex} : Exception→getStackTrace()⇒
↪→ {%[0− 9]+ : {[java.|javax.|org.apache.|com.sun.|sun.]%} : Array`,
↪→ + `$call`)
| (`{$ex} : Exception→getStackTrace()⇒%`,−`%`) ]
Figure 5.6. PoCo version of Polymer’s ClassLoaders policy.
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4. Concatenates contact information to the email text.
The message logging and confirmation popup is performed by the auxiliary log and confirm
actions, respectively.
5.3.2 Super Policies
Now we need to be able to appropriately combine the base policies such that our fi-
nal composition behaves like the original Email policy in Polymer. The IsClientSigned
InterruptToCheckMem(Double maxPercent, Long interval)∞ :
(`@first[%]⇐ %`,+ + `mail.interrupts.InterruptsGen.init($interval)`)
(`%⇒ @ig[%]`,+ + `$ig→start()`)
(`%`,+ + `$first`)
[ (`mail.interrupts.InterruptGen.interrupt()⇒ %`,+ + `Runtime.getRuntime()`)
(`%⇒ @run[%]`,+ + `run.totalMemory()`)
(`%⇒ @totalM [%]`,+ + `run.maxMemory()`)
(`%⇒ @maxM [%]`,+ + `div($totalM, $maxM)`)
(`%⇒ @decPerc[%]`,+ + `mult($decPerc, {100} : Double)`)
(`%⇒ @perc[%]`,+ + `gt($perc, $maxPercent)`)
[ (`%⇒ {true} : Boolean`,+ + `showConfirmDialog(null,
↪→ {More than $maxPercent% of the memory
↪→ available to the VM has been consumed} : String,
↪→ {Warning} : String,
↪→ {JOptionPane.WARNING MESSAGE} : Integer)`)
(`%`, θ)∞
| (`%`, θ) ]
| (`%`, θ) ]∞
Figure 5.7. PoCo version of Polymer’s InterruptToCheckMem policy.
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superpolicy, seen in Figure 5.10, selects which subpolicy to enforce depending on whether
the target is signed with a certificate. The left-hand subpolicy is expected to be less re-
strictive than that on the right. The idea is that a cryptographic signature establishes a
level of trust, so we can switch to enforcing a more lax policy on such a target. While it is
unknown whether the target is signed, we presume that it is not and enforce p2, the more
stringent policy. Once it is determined whether the target is signed (i.e., when isSigned()
is executed), we enforce the appropriate subpolicy for the remainder of the execution.
IncomingMail()∞ :
@getMail[`com.sun.mail.imap.IMAPFolder.expunge()
↪→ |com.sun.mail.imap.IMAPFolder.fetch(%)
↪→ |com.sun.mail.imap.IMAPFolder.getMessage(%)
↪→ |com.sun.mail.imap.IMAPFolder.getMessageByUID(%)
↪→ |com.sun.mail.imap.IMAPFolder.search(%)
↪→ |com.sun.mail.pop3.POP3Folder.expunge()
↪→ |com.sun.mail.pop3.POP3Folder.fetch(%)
↪→ |com.sun.mail.pop3.POP3Folder.getMessage(%)`]
WaitForAction `[$getMail | {%} : Message→getSubject()]`⋃+
−`$getMail`∓−`{%}:Message→getSubject()` [
(`$getMail⇒ @result{%}`,+ + `log($result)`)
| (`{@message[%]} : Message→getSubject()⇒ %`,
↪→ + +`spamifySubject($message)`) ]
∵ public static void log(Message m) {. . . }
∵ public static String spamifySubject(Message m) {. . . }
Figure 5.8. PoCo version of Polymer’s IncomingMail policy. See Appendix A for the aux-
iliary method definitions.
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The Audit superpolicy, depicted in Figure 5.11, maintains a log of all input actions and
its subpolicy’s response to them. When the first action is input, it is bound to act, the
subpolicy response is bound to out (via out ← p), and the log file is opened. Once the
log file is opened, act and out are written to the log. After updating the log, Audit has
OutgoingMail(String ContactInfo)∞ :
@sendMail[`javax.mail.T ransport.send(@msg[{%} : Message])
↪→ |javax.mail.T ransport.send(@msg[{%} : Message],%)
↪→ |com.sun.mail.smtp.SMTPTransport.
↪→ sendMessage(@msg[{%} : Message],%)`]
WaitForAction `$sendMail`⋃+
−`$sendMail` [
(`$sendMail⇒ %`,+ + `log($msg)`)
(`%`,+ + `confirm($msg)`)
[ (∼ `%⇒{JOptionPane.OK OPTION} : Integer`,+`null`)
| (`%⇒{JOptionPane.OK OPTION} : Integer`,
↪→ + +`$msg→AddBCC({“user@domain′′} : String)`)
(`%⇒@msg{%}`,+ + `$msg→getContent()`)
(`%⇒@content{%}`,+ + `strCat($content, $ContactInfo)`)
(%⇒@content{%}`,+ + `$msg→setContent($content)`)
(`%⇒@msg{%}`,+ + `mail.SendMail($msg)`)
(`%⇒@result{%}`,+`$result`)
] ]
∵ public static void log(Message m) {. . . }
∵ public static Integer confirm(Message m) {. . . }
Figure 5.9. PoCo version of Polymer’s OutgoingMail policy. See Appendix A for the aux-
iliary method definitions.
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to determine how the monitor would have proceeded if the subpolicy was being enforced
on its own. This is achieved by matching against the input and signed regular output in
the same manner as the MRA algorithm in Section 5.1. This algorithm entails determining
whether the subpolicy output positively signs infinitely-many events, which is performed
by the cardinality-testing expression | . . . | 6=∞. After emitting the appropriate output, the
subpolicy’s response is output while results are input. When the next action is input, the
bindings are updated and we loop back to the logging step.
Polymer’s Conjunction and Disjunction combinators generally output the “most re-
strictive” and “least restrictive” subpolicy output, respectively. However, both of them give
IsClientSigned(Policy p1, Policy p2) :
(∼ `isSigned()⇒ %`, , p2∓+`isSigned()`)∞
[ (`isSigned()⇒ {true} : Boolean`, , p1)
(`%`, , p1)∞
| (`isSigned()⇒ {false} : Boolean`, , p2)
(`%`, , p2)∞
]
∵ private static Boolean isSigned(){
Enumeration e = PoCo.getJarF ile().entries();
while(e.hasMoreElements()){
Certificate[] ca = ((JarEntry)e.nextElement()).getCertificates();
if (ca! = null && ca.length > 0 && ca[0]! = null)
return true;
}
returnfalse;
}
Figure 5.10. PoCo version of Polymer’s IsClientSigned combinator.
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highest priority to InsSugs the lowest priority to IrrSugs. In order to specify these policies
in a form that is truest to the Polymer versions, we establish an interpretation of Polymer’s
suggestions with respect to signed regular languages. For input event ein, each suggestion
has the following signed regular interpretation:
Audit(Policy p, String f) :
(`@act[%]⇐ %`, (out← p),+ + `fopen($f)`)
(`%→ @ps[%], ,+ + `log($ps, $out, $act)`)
[ [ (`%`, (|out⊥+ `%(%)`⊥+ ` ∼ $act`| 6=∞), out)
| (`%`, (`$act` ∈+ out),+`$act`)
| (`%`, (|out⊥+ `{%} : %`| 6=∞), out)
| (`%`, (`$act` 6∈± out),+`$act`)
| (`%`, , out) ]
(`%⇒ %`, , p)∞
(`@act[%]⇐ %`, (out← p),+ + `log($ps, $out, $act)`) ]∞
∵ private static PrintStream fopen(String fn){
return new PrintStream(
new BufferedOutputStream(
new FileOutputStream(fn)),
true);
}
∵ private static void log(PrintStream ps, SRE s,Action a){
ps.println(“On trigger action ” + a.toString());
ps.println(“Subpolicy output: ” + s.toString());
ps.println(“−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−\n”);
}
Figure 5.11. PoCo version of Polymer’s Audit policy.
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1. Irrelevant = θ
2. OK = +`ein`
3. Insert(a)(a 6= ein) = +`a`
4. Suppress = −`ein`
5. Replace(r) (r 6= ein) = +`r`
6. Halt = −`%`
Although insertion and replacement correspond to very similar signed regular languages,
we can use the regular expression `%(%)`to match actions and `{%}:%`to match results.
Therefore, sifting out a language’s positive or negative actions or results is simple, and
insertion can be distinguished from replacement.
The Conjunction combinator, whose PoCo listing appears in Figure 5.12, prioritizes
the various suggestion types, and outputs the subpolicy output with the highest priority.
This policy makes use of the `a ⇔ r` pattern, which matches the input, whether it is an
action or result, against the appropriate regular expression in the pattern. Because only
one of them will match, it makes sense to bind the same variable on both sides of the ⇔
symbol. The ⊥ operation is used when subpolicies both output insertions or both output
replacements so only their common positive events are output. This is similar to how the
Polymer version only considers two insertions and two replacements equal when their event
parameters are, but preserves subpolicy prohibitions. Finally, there is a catch-call case at
the end for outputs that do not fit squarely into one of the suggestion categories.
The Disjunction combinator, presented in Figure 5.15, is defined very similarly to
Conjunction, except the interior cases of Conjunction (i.e., Halt down to OK) are con-
sidered in the opposite order, and the last case combines the subpolicy outputs with ±
rather than ∓. The case where both subpolicies perform insertions still uses ⊥, rather
than >, to combine the outputs, because the Polymer version only combines InsSugs when
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Conjunction(Policy p1, Policy p2)∞ :
\\Insertions
(`@in[%]⇔ @in[%]`, (p1⊥+ `%(%)`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ,
↪→ p1⊥p2⊥+ `%(%)`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ),
↪→ p1⊥p2)
| (`@in[%]⇔ @in[%]`, (p1⊥+ `%(%)`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ), p1)
| (`@in[%]⇔ @in[%]`, (p2⊥+ `%(%)`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ), p2)
\\Halt
| (`%`, (p1 = −`%`), p1)
| (`%`, (p2 = −`%`), p2)
\\Suppression
| (`%`, (p1 = −`$in`), p1)
| (`%`, (p2 = −`$in`), p2)
\\Replacement
| (`@in[%]⇔ @in[%]`, (p1⊥+ `{%} : %`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ,
↪→ p1⊥p2⊥+ `{%} : %`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ),
↪→ p1⊥p2)
| (`@in[%]⇔ @in[%]`, (p1⊥+ `{%} : %`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ), p1)
| (`@in[%]⇔ @in[%]`, (p2⊥+ `{%} : %`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ), p2)
\\OK
| (`%`, (p1 = +`$in`), p1)
| (`%`, (p2 = +`$in`), p2)
\\Can’t reach this point with Polymer-like outputs
| (`%`, , p1∓ p2)
Figure 5.12. PoCo version of Polymer’s Conjunction policy.
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the inserted actions are equal. The case where both subpolicy outputs are replacements is
handled similarly.
The Dominates superpolicy has two subpolicies, p1 and p2. Dominates simply outputs
whatever p2 does if the input is irrelevant to p1; otherwise, it outputs whatever p1 does.
That is, p1 “dominates” p2, where p2 only gets a say if p1 has no interesting response. This
policy is shown in Figure 5.13.
Dominates(Policy p1, Policy p2)∞ :
(`%`, (p1 = θ), p2)
| (`%`, , p1)
Figure 5.13. PoCo version of Polymer’s Dominates policy.
The TryWith superpolicy also has two subpolicies, p1 and p2. This combinator is pre-
sented in Figure 5.14. It outputs whatever p1 outputs, unless p1 suggests halting, suppres-
sion, or replacement. When it does, then the combinator outputs whatever p2 outputs. In
other words, this superpolicy enforces p1 foremost, but falls back to p2 for inputs that p1
is opposed to. This superpolicy’s behavior is similar to Try{. . . }With{. . . } constructs in
general-purpose programming languages, in which execution proceeds to a secondary block
of code when an error arises in the primary block.
TryWith(Policy p1, Policy p2)∞ :
(`%`, (p1 = θ), p1)
| (`@in[%]⇔ @in[%]`, (+`$in` = p1), p1)
| (`@in[%]⇔ @in[%]`, (p1⊥+ `%(%)`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ), p1)
| (`%`, , p2)
Figure 5.14. PoCo version of Polymer’s TryWith policy.
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Disjunction(Policy p1, Policy p2)∞ :
\\Insertions
(`@in[%]⇔ @in[%]`, (p1⊥+ `%(%)`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ,
↪→ p1⊥p2⊥+ `%(%)`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ),
↪→ p1⊥p2)
| (`@in[%]⇔ @in[%]`, (p1⊥+ `%(%)`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ), p1)
| (`@in[%]⇔ @in[%]`, (p2⊥+ `%(%)`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ), p2)
\\OK
| (`%`, (p1 = +`$in`), p1)
| (`%`, (p2 = +`$in`), p2)
\\Replacement
| (`@in[%]⇔ @in[%]`, (p1⊥+ `{%} : %`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ,
↪→ p1⊥p2⊥+ `{%} : %`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ),
↪→ p1⊥p2)
| (`@in[%]⇔ @in[%]`, (p1⊥+ `{%} : %`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ), p1)
| (`@in[%]⇔ @in[%]`, (p2⊥+ `{%} : %`⊥+ ` ∼ $in` 6= θ), p2)
\\Suppression
| (`%`, (p1 = −`$in`), p1)
| (`%`, (p2 = −`$in`), p2)
\\Halt
| (`%`, (p1 = −`%`), p1)
| (`%`, (p2 = −`%`), p2)
\\Can’t reach this point with Polymer-like outputs
| (`%`, , p1± p2)
Figure 5.15. PoCo version of Polymer’s Disjunction policy.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
It is possible to create tools that aid the principled specification of expressive, com-
posable software-security policies. Existing graphical tools for security-policy specification
are limited to particular security domains and cannot be used for general software-security
policies. Existing policy-specification languages that are simple and compose well have lim-
ited expressiveness (e.g., access control), and more expressive languages are complicated
and suffer in terms of composability. This dissertation provides two aids to combat these
shortcomings:
1. PoliSeer—A graphical tool for specifying, visualizing, and modifying composable
policies.
2. PoCo—A policy-specification language whose policies are specified simply, compose
well, and are expressive.
PoliSeer users rely on policy-composition experts to distribute libraries of universally
composable policies (written in a language like Polymer). PoliSeer users can then build
complex policies by composing those expert-written policies in meaningful ways. For exam-
ple, we have constructed complex email-client and PoliSeer policies (Chapter 3; Figures 2.6
and 3.4). In our experience, PoliSeer has been a great aid for quickly specifying and gener-
ating code to enforce complex policies built as compositions of simpler subpolicies.
We believe PoliSeer is useful, even for expert policy engineers, for clearly and conve-
niently visualizing complex policy trees. Moreover, PoliSeer’s interface contains several con-
siderations for conveniently modifying policies, such as policy replacement, branch-insertion
points (BIPs), and branch deletions (Chapter 2; Figure 2.8). Thus, we view PoliSeer as an
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integrated development environment (IDE) for security policies, providing policy engineers
the same sorts of benefits that traditional IDEs provide software engineers (convenience of
creating high-level specifications and visualizations to minimize errors in, or totally avoid,
low-level programming tasks).
PoCo users specify software security policies in terms of input-output (to/from the mon-
itor) event sequences. These sequences may be defined generally, using regular expressions
to describe the matching inputs and combinations of signed regular expressions to express
the desired, irrelevant, and prohibited outputs at once. These descriptive outputs compose
well: operations for combining them satisfy a large number of algebraic properties (Chap-
ter 4.1). These properties ease the policy-specification effort because policy hierarchies
are less sensitive to organizational details (e.g., we can ignore the order of a commutative
combinator’s subpolicies).
Poco is also expressive, which was demonstrated by implementing a sophisticated policy
on an email client (Chapter 5). However, implementing the policies in a way that emulates
their behavior in Polymer is cumbersome because policy outputs are much more expressive
in PoCo. That is, we have to go against our principles of directly combining the subpolicy
outputs and try to determine if they correspond to certain types of Polymer suggestions.
The most striking instances of this difference are the Conjunction and Disjunction com-
binators, each of which takes thirteen abstract exchanges to express. In contrast, rich
conjunctive and disjunctive combinators can be specified in PoCo using a single abstract
exchange by simply applying the ⊥ and > operations on subpolicy outputs, respectively.
Because PoCo policies have a form akin to executions, policy authors are confronted
explicitly with the sequences of behaviors that policies can exhibit. The explicitness of the
policy definitions promotes thorough consideration of all possibilities at each stage, which
should minimize programmer oversight. PoCo’s declarative style makes literal combina-
tion of policies as data quite natural. Literal combination can be helpful for specifying
more sophisitcated policies as sequences of small policies that contain only a few abstract
exchanges.
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The PoliSeer and PoCo efforts, though discussed separately, are also helpful together.
Consider that literal combination could be used with a tool like PoliSeer visually specify
some base policies. For example, a policy hierarchy using the concatenative combinator and
the OneFileRead policy would constitute a visual representation as well as an implementa-
tion of the LimitFileReads policy (for a specific limit).
In the future, we plan to continue to study techniques and tools for managing policy
composition. Our highest-priority future work involves implementing the PoCo language.
From this implementation, we plan to experiment with static policy analyses, which may
be helpful for detecting policy errors and for policy optimization.
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Appendix A Omitted Auxiliary Methods From Section 5.3
The IncomingMail specification omits the following method definitions, taken from [3]:
public static void log(Message m) {
logFile = new PrintStream(new BufferedOutputStream(
new FileOutputStream(“/examples/mail/incoming.log”, true)));
Message[] ma = GetMail.convertResult(m);
if(ma==null) return;
//log each message if it hasn’t already been logged
for(int i = 0; i<ma.length; i++) {
String id = “”;
try {
id = ma[i].getSentDate()+ma[i].getFrom()[0].toString()+ma[i].getSubject();
} catch(Exception e) { }
if(id.equals(“”)==false && loggedTable.containsKey(id)==false) {
loggedTable.put(id, new Object());
try {
Enumeration e = ma[i].getAllHeaders();
logFile.println(“−−−−− <PoCo NEXT MESSAGE> −−−−”);
while(e.hasMoreElements()) {
Header h = ((Header)(e.nextElement()));
logFile.println(h.getName() + “: ” + h.getValue());
}
Object content = ma[i].getContent();
if(content instanceof String)
logFile.println(content);
else if(content instanceof Multipart) {
Multipart mmp = (Multipart)content;
for(int j = 0; j<mmp.getCount(); j++) {
BodyPart mbp = (BodyPart)(mmp.getBodyPart(j));
Object cont = mbp.getContent();
logFile.println(“<PoCo>Multipart message, PART ” + j + “:”);
if(cont instanceof String) {
logFile.println(“<PoCo:Type is ” + mbp.getContentType() + “>”);
logFile.println(cont);
}
else
logFile.println(“<PoCo:Part not displayed; type is ”
+ mbp.getContentType() + “>”);
logFile.println(“”);
}
}
else logFile.println(“<PoCo>Unknown message type:\n” + content);
}
catch(Exception exn) {
logFile.println(“<PoCo>There was an error opening the mail:\n” + exn);
}
logFile.flush();
}
}
public static String spamifySubject(Message m) {
int MAX SUBJ LEN=32;
String subj = m.getSubject();
if(subj.length>MAX SUBJ LEN)
subj=subj.substring(0, MAX SUBJ LEN);
if(isSenderKnown(m)==false) {
subj + “SPAM?: ” + s;
if(hasAttachment(m)) {
JOptionPane.showMessageDialog(null,“This message contains an attachment that, if opened,” +
“ could seriously harm\nyour computer. Unless you specifically asked the sender for” +
” this attachment,\nit is strongly recommended that you delete this message immediately.“,
“Beware”, JOptionPane.WARNING MESSAGE);
}
}
return subj;
}
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Appendix A (Continued)
The OutgoingMail specification omits the following method definitions, taken from [3]:
public static void log(Message m) {
try {
logFile = new PrintStream(new BufferedOutputStream(
new FileOutputStream(“/examples/mail/outgoing.log”, true)));
Enumeration e = m.getAllHeaders();
logFile.println(“−−−−−−−−−− <POLYMER NEXT MESSAGE> −−−−−−−−−−”);
while(e.hasMoreElements()) {
Header h = ((Header)(e.nextElement()));
logFile.println(h.getName() + “: ” + h.getValue());
}
Object content = m.getContent();
if(content instanceof String)
logFile.println(content);
else if(content instanceof Multipart) {
Multipart mmp = (Multipart)content;
for(int j = 0; j<mmp.getCount(); j++) {
BodyPart mbp = (BodyPart)(mmp.getBodyPart(j));
Object cont = mbp.getContent();
logFile.println(“<PoCo>Multipart message, PART ” + j + “:”);
if(cont instanceof String) {
logFile.println(“<PoCo:Type is ” + mbp.getContentType() + “>”);
logFile.println(cont);
}
else
logFile.println(“<PoCo:Part not displayed; type is ” + mbp.getContentType() + “>”);
logFile.println(“”);
}
}
else logFile.println(“<PoCo>Unknown message type:\n” + content);
}
catch(Exception exn) {
logFile.println(“<PoCo>There was an error opening the mail:\n” + exn);
}
}
public static Integer confirm(Message m) {
String confirmMsg = “You are sending email with subject\n”;
try {
String subj = m.getSubject();
if(subj.length() > 32)
confirmMsg += “ ” + subj.substring(0, 30) + “..\nto the following address(es).\n”;
else
confirmMsg += “ ” + subj + “\nto the following address(es)\n”;
Address[] recips = m.getAllRecipients();
if(recips==null || recips.length==0)
confirmMsg += “<could not find any recipients of message!>\n”;
else {
for(int j = 0; j<recips.length && j<20; j++) {
confirmMsg += “ ” + recips[j].toString() + “\n”;
}
if(recips.length >= 20) confirmMsg += “ ...\n”;
}
}
catch(Exception e) {
confirmMsg += “ <could not obtain subject/recipient of message>\n”;
}
confirmMsg += “Select:\n “Yes” to allow this mail to be sent,\n”;
confirmMsg += “ “No” to halt the email client (without sending this mail), or\n”;
confirmMsg += ” “Cancel” to not send the currently outgoing mail but allow\n“ +
” the email client to continue running.“;
return JOptionPane.showConfirmDialog(null, confirmMsg, “Security Question”,
JOptionPane.YES NO CANCEL OPTION));
}
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